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THE 2003 LEGISLATIVE ASSAULT ON VIOLENT VIDEO
GAMES: JUDICIAL REALITIES AND
REGULATORY RHETORIC
CLAY CALVERT*
ROBERT D. RicHARDs**
INTRODUCTION
The year 2003 was not kind to the foes of video games that
depict violent images.' First, in January, the United States Supreme
Court upheld a federal appellate court decision dismissing a lawsuit
against several video game manufacturers for allegedly causing
Michael Carneal to murder three girls at Heath High School near
Paducah, Kentucky, in 1997.2 Then, in June 2003, a federal appel-
late court enjoined a St. Louis County, Missouri, ordinance that
made unlawful the selling or renting of graphically violent video
games to minors without parental consent, because it could not sur-
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University. B.A., 1987, Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the
Coil), 1991, McGeorge School of Law, University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Com-
munication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of California. The authors
thank Miranda J. Brady, doctoral student in the College of Communications, for
her research assistance that contributed to this article.
** Robert D. Richards is Professor of Journalism & Law and Founding Co-
Director of the Pennsylvania Center for the First Amendment at The Pennsylvania
State University. B.A., 1983, M.A. 1984, Communications, The Pennsylvania State
University; J.D., 1987, The American University. Member, State Bar of
Pennsylvania.
1. See Mike Snider, Eye of the Beholder? Conflicting Video Game Research Reflects an
Escalating Debate, USA TODAY, Aug. 5, 2003, at 6D [hereinafter Beholder]. In fact,
the year was so bad for those who would regulate the video game industry that
even the mainstream media have noted that the "[o]pponents of regulations are
on a roll." Id.
2. SeeJames v. Meow Media, Inc., 300 F.3d 683, 684 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. de-
nied, 537 U.S. 1159 (2003) (holding video games do not constitute "products" for
purposes of imposing strict liability).
(203)
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vive constitutional scrutiny.3 Finally, in July 2003, Judge Robert S.
Lasnik issued a preliminary injunction preventing Washington from
enforcing a first-of-its-kind statute prohibiting the sale or rental to
minors of video and computer games that depict realistic images of
violence on simulated law enforcement officers.
4
The first in the above-mentioned trio of decisions mirrors a
pair of federal district court opinions from 2002 dismissing other
civil lawsuits filed against video game manufacturers. 5 The latter
two decisions, involving St. Louis County and Washington, come
relatively quickly on the heels of a unanimous 2001 opinion by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit striking
down an Indianapolis, Indiana ordinance restricting minors' access
to violent video games. 6 It seems that the judicial tide is now firmly
against both civil lawsuits and legislation targeting video game man-
ufacturers for selling products that supposedly cause or contribute
to real-life violence.
Yet such opinions, and the overwhelming weight ofjudicial au-
thority in favor of the First Amendment right of free expression,
7
3. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 960
(8th Cir. 2003), petition for reh'g en banc denied, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 13782 (2003)
(holding county ordinance violated First Amendment right to free speech when
applying strict scrutiny analysis).
4. See Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 8,
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, (W.D. Wash. 2003) (No. C03-1245L)
("Plaintiffs have raised serious questions regarding defendants' ability to show that
the Act, even if crafted to further a compelling state interest, is narrowly tailored to
alleviate the perceived harm."). The Washington law was back before Judge Lasnik
again in June 2004 when he heard oral argument on summary judgment motions
filed by both parties in the case. SeeJohn Cook, Court Duel on Video Violence, SEAT-
TLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, June 25, 2004, at Cl.
5. See Sanders v. Acclaim Entm't, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264, 1268 (D. Colo.
2002) (dismissing negligence and products liability claims against manufacturer of
video game Doom filed by widow and stepchildren of teacher killed at Columbine
High School in April 1999); Wilson v. Midway Games, Inc., 198 F. Supp. 2d 167,
169 (D. Conn. 2002) (dismissing product liability, unfair trade practices, and emo-
tional distress claims filed by mother of boy stabbed to death by another youth
allegedly obsessed with video game Mortal Kombat); see also Clay Calvert, 2002 Sym-
posium Update: Media Liability for Violent Conduct: One Year Later, 23 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.
REv. 247, 249-50 (2003) (analyzing four pro-media opinions from 2002 involving
harm allegedly caused by media products).
6. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 579-80 (7th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001) (determining city failed to show compelling
interest in restricting access to video games depicting violent acts). See generally
Clay Calvert, Violence, Video Games and a Voice of Reason: Judge Posner to the Defense of
Kids' Culture and the First Amendment, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1 (2002) (lauding Sev-
enth Circuit court of appeals' opinion in Kendrick) [hereinafter Violence].
7. See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provides in relevant part that "Congress shall make no law... abridging
the freedom of speech, or of the press." Id. The free speech and free press clauses
have been incorporated, through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause,
[Vol. 11: p. 203
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have done little if anything to hinder efforts by proponents to im-
pose legislative restrictions on minors' access to violent video
games. For instance, in February 2003, Representative Joe Baca in-
troduced the "Protect Children from Video Game Sex and Violence
Act of 2003"8 to Congress which, as Baca trumpeted in an official
press release, "would make it a federal crime for retailers to sell
ultra violent and sexually explicit video games to minors because
the games can be harmful to children." 9 Representative Baca, a
Democrat from Rialto, California, contends "kids are being brain-
washed" by video games. 10 As this article makes clear in Part III,
this type of bombastic hyperbole is just one example of the rhetoric
employed by the growing legion of legislators1 and other anti-
video game advocates who seek to curb minors' access to the in-
creasingly popular products.12
to apply to state and local government entities and officials. See Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("[W]e may and do assume that freedom of speech
and of the press - which are protected by the First Amendment from abridge-
ment by Congress - are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties'
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impair-
ment by the States.").
8. H.R. 669, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing prohibition on sale or rental of
violent and sexually explicit video games to minors).
9. Press Release, Cop Killing, Prostitution, Mass Murder, Sodomy - Is it All
Just a Game? (Feb. 13, 2003) (announcing reintroduction of bill, which died in
committee under previous Congress), at http://www.house.gov/baca/108th/
pr030213a.htm.
10. See Press Release, Baca to Federal Trade Commission: "What are you do-
ing to protect our kids?" (Apr. 10, 2003) (reporting on hearings before House
Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary Appropriations Committee), at http://
www.house.gov/baca/108th/pr030410.htm.
11. See Undated Letter from Howard L. Berman and John Conyers, Jr., Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, to Colleague, entitled "Concerned About Video Game Vio-
lence? Legislation Trammeling the First Amendment Isn't the Answer: Promote
Parental Awareness and Retailer Enforcement of Game Ratings" (on file with au-
thors). It is important to note that not all members of Congress support the Baca-
proposed legislation. For instance, Representative John Conyers, Jr., of Michigan,
the ranking minority member of the House of Representatives Committee on the
Judiciary, along with Representative Howard L. Berman from California, drafted a
letter to their colleagues in Congress stating in pertinent part that "[t]he consis-
tent case law makes it clear that H.R. 669 is an unconstitutional violation of the
First Amendment" and suggesting to House members that "your time would be
better spent promoting parental awareness and retailer enforcement of video
game ratings, rather than working for enactment of unconstitutional legislation."
Id.
12. See Top Ten Industry Facts, Entertainment Software Association Media
Center, at http://www.theesa.com/pressroom.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
According to the Entertainment Software Association, the organization formerly
known as the Interactive Digital Software Association and a named party in several
of the cases described in this article, sales of computer and video game software in
2003 grew 8% from 2002, generating $7 billion in sales. See id. "In 2003, more
3
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Representative Baca and the more than forty co-sponsors of
the federal legislation who had joined him by June 2003 are not
alone in their quest to enact access-limitation legislation. At the
state level, legislation was introduced across the country in 2003.
For instance, a bill was introduced in South Carolina in May 2003
by Ralph Davenport, a Republican from Boiling Springs in Spartan-
burg County.13 The bill provides, in relevant part, that "[a] person
who sells, rents, or permits to be sold or rented a violent video or
violent computer game is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon con-
viction must be imprisoned not more than one year, or fined not
more than one thousand dollars."14
Likewise, in Pennsylvania, Democratic State Senator Jack Wag-
ner introduced a bill in June 2003 that states "[a] person commits a
summary offense if the person sells, rents or otherwise provides for
use for a charge any violent video or computer game to a minor. A
person commits a misdemeanor of the third degree for a second or
subsequent violation of this subsection." 15 Wagner introduced simi-
lar legislation earlier in 2003 that provided:
A person commits a summary offense if the person sells,
rents or otherwise provides for use for a charge any video
game to a minor[,] which contains scenes or depictions of
graphic violence as determined by the Entertainment
Software Rating Board. A person commits a misdemeanor
of the third degree for a second or subsequent violation of
this subsection. 16
In addition to South Carolina and Pennsylvania, legislative ini-
tiatives that would restrict minors' access to violent or graphic video
games were introduced and were pending in 2003 in Delaware, 17
than 239 million computer and video games were sold, or almost two games for
every household in America." Id.
13. See H.R. 4148, 115th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2003-04) (criminalizing
sale or rental of violent video games), available at http://www.scstatehouse.net/.
14. Id. § 1.
15. S. 822, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § I (Pa. 2003) (criminalizing sale or
furnishing of violent video games to minors).
16. S. 349, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 6321 (a) (Pa. 2003) (outlining of-
fenses for selling interactive violent video games to minors).
17. See H.R. 221, 142d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2003). This bill makes it
a misdemeanor offense:
for a person to sell at retail or rent or attempt to sell at retail or rent, to
(1) a person under the age of 17 any video game with an official rating of
"M" for mature audiences or (2) a person under the age of 18 any video
game with an official rating of "AO" for adult only audiences. A person
attempting to purchase or rent a video game rated for mature or adults
4
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol11/iss2/1
2004] 2003 LEGISLATIVE ASSAULT ON VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES 207
Michigan,18 Minnesota, 19 New Jersey, 20 and New York.21 In addi-
tion to these measures, each of which was alive and pending at the
only audiences shall be required to show an identification card that pro-
vides a date of birth.
Id. § 1.
18. See H.R. 4267, 92d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2003). This bill, introduced in
February 2003, makes it a misdemeanor offense "punishable by imprisonment for
not more than 90 days or a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or both" for a person
to "sell or rent a restricted video game to a person who is less than 17 years of age.
As used in this section, 'restricted video game' means a video game rated AO or M
by the entertainment software rating board." Id. § 143(a).
19. See S. 35, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2003). This bill, which was intro-
duced in January 2003, would make it a misdemeanor for a person to "sell or rent a
restricted video game to a person under 17 years of age" and defines the term
"restricted video game" to mean "a video game rated AO or M by the entertain-
ment software rating board." Id. § 1. In addition, another bill introduced in the
Minnesota Senate in May 2003 - this one targeting minors who purchaser video
games rather than the retail sellers and distributors - provides in pertinent part
that "[a] person under the age of 17 who knowingly rents or purchases a restricted
video game is guilty of a petty misdemeanor and is subject to a fine of not more
than $25." S. 1140, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Minn. 2003).
20. See S. 2194, 210th Leg., Reg. Sess. (NJ. 2003). This bill was introduced in
January 2003 by State Senators Joseph A. Palaia and John 0. Bennett and closely
tracks the legislation proposed in Delaware. It provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for a person to sell at retail or rent, or attempt to sell
at retail or rent, to (1) a person under age 17 any video game clearly
designated as rated for mature, or restricted audiences or (2) a person
under age 18 any such game for adults only audiences. A person attempt-
ing to purchase or rent a video game rated for mature or adults only
audiences shall be required to show an identification card that provides a
date of birth.
Id. § 2(a); see also supra note 17 (setting forth similar legislation proposed in
Delaware).
21. See A. 3999, 2003 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003). This bill, which was introduced
in February 2003, provides in relevant part that:
Every owner, proprietor or manager of a commercial establishment that
offers or displays one or more video games or interactive media devices
for use by the public shall prohibit a person under sixteen years of age
from playing or using any video game or interactive media device which
as part of the use of such game, requires the player to use a model or toy
replica of a gun, pistol, rifle or similar weapon which simulates firing
ammunition.
Id. § 4.
In addition, another Assembly bill proposed in February 2003 provides that
"[n]o owner or operator of any premises where video games, including a violent
point and shoot video simulator, are provided for entertainment shall permit a
person under the age of eighteen to operate such violent point and shoot video
simulator." A. 3571, 2003 Reg. Sess. § 1 (N.Y. 2003).
A third bill proposed in New York in 2003 provides in relevant part:
No person, partnership or corporation shall sell or rent or offer to sell or
rent to any person under the age of eighteen years any video game that
contains depictions descriptive of, advocating or glamorizing commission
of a violent crime, suicide, sodomy, rape, incest, bestiality, sado-masoch-
ism, any form of sexual activity in a violent context, or advocating or en-
couraging murder, violent racism, religious violence, morbid violence or
the illegal use of drugs or alcohol.
5
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time this article was written, legislation was also proposed in other
states during 2003 but has since died. 22 In brief, a veritable pleth-
ora of legislative measures targeting graphic, violent, or sexual
video games surfaced in 2003.
In the state of Washington, Assistant Attorney General Jeff
Even has vowed to appeal the decision of U.S. District Court Judge
Robert Lasnik's order enjoining that state's legislation. 23 As he told
a reporter after the judge's order, "[o] bviously we've got to take a
shot at defending the law. The people are entitled to their day in
court."2 4 The people certainly will end up paying for their day in
court too; it will cost Washington taxpayers an estimated $90,000 to
defend the legislation against overwhelming odds.25 Whether such
money is well spent apparently is not an issue for the law's primary
sponsor, Mary Lou Dickerson, who, after Judge Lasnik's decision,
stated that she "strongly believe [s] the courts will decide that the
sickening levels of violence, brutality and racism being peddled to
children for profit cannot be wrapped in our precious First
Amendment."26
We now are in the middle of a new chapter of an age-old story
that pits the protection of children from speech and its supposedly
deleterious effects, 27 against the First Amendment rights of chil-
S. 2327, 2003 Reg. Sess. § 1 (N.Y. 2003). This language mirrors that found in a
fourth bill introduced in New York in 2003. See A. 3780, 2003 Reg. Sess. § 2 (N.Y.
2003).
22. See, e.g., H.R. 2739, 84th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2003) (seeking to
prohibit any person or entity from "knowingly sell[ing] or rent[ing] a video game
that is harmful to minors unless the minor is accompanied by a parent or legal
guardian who consents to the purchase or rental"); S. 2024, 2003 Reg. Sess. (Fla.
2003) (creating third-degree felony for anyone "who knowingly sells or rents an
adult video game to person younger than [eighteen] years of age" and which de-
fined term "adult video game" to mean "any video recording of a game which
contains representations or images of excessive violence, nudity or sexual conduct
that is harmful to persons younger than 18 years of age, or criminal activity"); S.
586, 2003 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2003) (providing it is unlawful to "sell or rent or
offer to sell or rent to any person under the age of eighteen any video game or
computer game which has been given a rate of 'Mature' or 'For Adults Only' or an
equivalent rating by the video or computer game manufacturer or any entertain-
ment rating board that is commonly used in the industry").
23. Dan Richman, Judge Blocks Law Curbing Some Violent Video Games, SEATrLE
POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 11, 2003, at Al; see also supra note 4 and accompanying
text (describing judge's order).
24. Richman, supra note 23, at Al.
25. See id. (indicating intention to further pursue constitutionality of Wash-
ington Law restricting violent video games).
26. Paul Queary, Federal Judge Blocks Violent Video Games Law, Assoc. PRESS
STATE & LOCAL WIRE, July 11, 2003, available at LEXIS-NEXIS Academic Universe.
27. See GEORGE RODMAN, MAKING SENSE OF MEDIA: AN INTRODucTION TO MASS
COMMUNICATION 368-69 (2001) (writing "concerns about the impact of media are
[Vol. 11: p. 203
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dren to receive that speech, and rights of manufacturers to produce
and distribute speech to children. 28 It is a common situation in
which, as First Amendment scholar and Dean of the University of
Richmond's T.C. Williams School of Law Rodney Smolla put it, the
government attempts to "regulate the speech children are exposed
to and thus restrict what adults say to children."29 In this case, the
adults restricted are in the video game industry.30 What is radically
different now, however, is the technology. Video and computer
games with incredibly realistic and vibrant images provide the land-
scape for the legislative battle currently being waged across the
United States.
This article examines the intensifying conflict between those
who would regulate the video games to which children are exposed
and those in the video game industry, as well as free speech advo-
cates, who would protect minors' access to such speech products.
In particular, this article takes a comprehensive, three-pronged ap-
proach to the conflict and looks at judicial realities, legislative ini-
tiatives, and rhetorical strategies.
First, Part I examines legal precedent and judicial analysis by
reviewing two of the opinions handed down by federal courts in
2003 - Interactive Digital Software Association v. St. Louis County31 and
Video Software Dealers Association v. Maleng32 - in which access-re-
striction laws were enjoined. 33 Part II then turns to bills and legisla-
tion now pending at the federal and state levels and analyzes several
specific examples to determine whether some of these new mea-
sures, if enacted, would be held unconstitutional in light of the
opinions and precedent examined in Part 1.34 Next, Part III exam-
as old as the media themselves" and describing Payne Fund studies conducted in
1929 by social scientists because "[a]t this time, children went to the movies, on
average, once a week, and many experts and lay people were concerned that chil-
dren seemed to be picking up antisocial habits from their movie viewing").
28. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 640 (1968) (citing government's
legitimate "interest in the well-being of its youth" as justifying New York's statute
prohibiting sale to minors of sexually explicit material, which is otherwise non-
obscene and accessible for adults). This tension, although addressed in this article
in the context of images of violence in video games, is particularly prevalent in
efforts to restrict minors' access to sexually explicit expression that is otherwise
suitable for adults. See id.
29. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FIRE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY 329 (Knopf, Inc.
1992).
30. For a discussion of the First Amendmant rights of "video retailers" at
stake, see infra note 178 and accompanying text.
31. 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003).
32. No. C03-1245L (W.D. Wash. 2003).
33. See infra notes 37-178 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 179-300 and accompanying text.
7
Calvert: The 2003 Legislative Assault on Violent Video Games: Judicial Rea
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
210 VILLANovA SPORTS & ENT. LAW JOURNAL
ines the rhetorical devices, arguments, and strategies most often
employed by the proponents of access-restriction legislation that al-
low them to continue to initiate and generate bills that have little
chance of being upheld when challenged by the video game indus-
try.3 5 Finally, the article concludes by arguing that voices of reason
must prevail to protect the First Amendment and that state and fed-
eral resources are being squandered in misguided and fruitless ef-
forts to protect children and society from speculative harms. 3 6
I. JUDICIAL REALITIES FROM 2003: WIY VIDEO GAME ACCESS-
LIMITATION LAws ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL
When Judge Richard Posner reminded the City of Indianapolis
back in 2001 that "[c]hildren have First Amendment rights" and
then went on to strike down that city's ordinance forbidding unac-
companied minors in arcades with five or more machines from
playing video games deemed to be "harmful to minors,"3 7 he estab-
lished a precedent that would influence decisions handed down
just two years later in Interactive Digital Software Association and Video
Software Dealers Association.
Posner, writing for a unanimous three-judge panel of the Sev-
enth Circuit in American Amusement Machine Association v. Kendrick,3 8
placed video game violence in the historical literary context of The
Divine Comedy and The Odyssey and made it clear that "[v]iolence
and obscenity are distinct categories of objectionable depiction,"
with the former receiving First Amendment protection and the lat-
ter lacking such a safeguard.3 9 He added that "the world of kids'
popular culture . .. is not lightly to be suppressed" and that, in
reference to Indianapolis's ordinance, "conditioning a minor's First
Amendment rights on parental consent of this nature is a curtail-
ment of those rights."40
Posner also noted that although video games involve an inter-
active quality that allows users to change the outcome of the story,
this does not place them outside of the scope of First Amendment
35. See infra notes 301-74 and accompanying text.
36. See infta notes 375-81 and accompanying text.
37. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 576 (7th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 994 (2001).
38. Id. at 579-80.
39. Id. at 574 (submitting lack of constitutional protection for obscene mate-
rial does not necessarily extend to violent material).
40. Id. at 578 (arguing many children would abstain from playing violent
video games if in company of their parents).
[Vol. 11: p. 203
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protection.41 Posner wisely observed that "[a]ll literature (here
broadly defined to include movies, television and other photo-
graphic media, and popular as well as highbrow literature) is inter-
active; the better it is, the more interactive." 42 Along the way,
Posner also rejected the social science evidence offered by Indian-
apolis as not providing the kind of "compelling"43 grounds neces-
sary to support a content-based regulation of speech. 44 He
concluded by slashing "the entirely conjectural nature of the bene-
fits of the ordinance to the people of Indianapolis.
45
Although Posner's precedent from the Seventh Circuit is
clearly not binding on judges in other federal circuits, it would em-
body the same logic and reasoning later embraced in 2003 by the
Eighth Circuit considering a very similar ordinance in St. Louis
County, Missouri, and by a federal district court in Washington.
Those cases, described below, are compared with Posner's decision
in Kendrick.
A. Interactive Digital Software Association v. St. Louis County
In October 2000, the St. Louis County Council approved, by a
5-0 vote, a bill introduced by then-Councilman Jeff Wagener that
would generate years of litigation and cost the local government
thousands of dollars to defend. 46 The bill amended the St. Louis
County Revised ordinances to make it unlawful to knowingly sell,
rent, or make generally available graphically violent video games to
minors, or to permit minors to play these games without the con-
sent of a parent or guardian. 47 Wagener, the bill's sponsor, claimed
it was necessary because "[e]xposure to such violence has been
linked to anti-social and violent behavior, such as the school shoot-
ings in Columbine, Jonesboro, and Paducah. ''48
41. Id. at 577 (trumpeting merits of interactivity).
42. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 577.
43. Id. at 576.
44. See generally Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent Appli-
cations of an Increasingly Malleable Doctrine, 29 McGEORCE L. REV. 69 (1997) (discuss-
ing judicial scrutiny of content-based and content-neutral laws).
45. Kendrick, 244 F.3d at 580 (noting harm on city of injunction would be
slight and outweighed by harm on plaintiffs if there was no injunction in place).
46. See Deborah Peterson, Restriction on Violent Video Games Has Surprising Sup-
porters, ST. Louis PosT-DIsPATCH, Oct. 27, 2000, at C4 (noting increase of support
for ban on violent video games).
47. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 956
(8th Cir. 2003) (detailing relevant portions of ordinance).
48. Phil Sutin, County Official Wants to Restrict Sex Video Games, ST. Louis PosT-
DISPATCH, Sept. 29, 2000, at C1. Media products were largely blamed for the April
1999 tragedy at Columbine High School near Littleton, Colorado, in which Eric
9
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Even before the bill was passed, it drew the attention and wrath
of an organization then called the Interactive Digital Software Asso-
ciation ("IDSA"). The IDSA, now known as the Entertainment
Software Association, serves the business and public affairs needs of
companies involved with interactive games for video game consoles,
handheld devices, personal computers, and the Internet.49 At a St.
Louis County Council meeting held on October 12, 2000 - two
weeks before the bill was passed - general counsel and senior vice
president of the IDSA, Gail Markels, told the members of the Coun-
cil that voluntary steps are better than legal ones and added that
the bill would violate constitutional protection of free speech. 50
Markels was eventually proved correct when the Eighth Circuit
declared in June 2003 that the county's ordinance was unconstitu-
tional for failing to survive the strict scrutiny standard of judicial
review.51 Under this standard of review, the government may "regu-
late the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive
means to further the articulated interest. ' 52 Before the Eighth Cir-
cuit could apply this test and reach its decidedly pro-First Amend-
ment conclusion, the case was heard by district court Judge
Stephen N. Limbaugh. 53
Judge Limbaugh's opinion was anything but pro-First Amend-
ment. In fact, he ruled that the IDSA failed to meet its initial bur-
den "of showing that video games are a protected form of speech
under the First Amendment."54 The court reviewed "four different
Harris and Dylan Klebold went on a deadly shooting rampage before killing them-
selves. See generally Clay Calvert, Media Bashing at the Turn of the Century: The Threat
to Free Speech After Columbine High and Jenny Jones, 2000 L. Riv. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 151
(2000) (providing examples of attacks on media products after worst school shoot-
ing in United States history).
49. See Entertainment Software Association, at http://www.theesa.com (last visited
June 2, 2004).
50. See Phil Sutin, Constitution Protects Violent Video Games, Industry Contends, ST.
Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Oct. 13, 2000, at D4 (noting arguments in favor of constitu-
tional protection of video games).
51. See United States v. Playboy Ent. Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(writing "a content-based speech restriction" is constitutional "only if it satisfies
strict scrutiny," and defining this test to mean statute "must be narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling Government interest"); see also Interactive Digital Software
Ass'n, 329 F.3d at 960.
52. Sable Communications of Calif., Inc. v. Fed. Communications Comm'n,
492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (outlining strict scrutiny analysis).
53. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d
1126 (E.D. Mo. 2002), rev'd, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding county ordi-
nance was narrowly tailored to serve compelling interest).
54. Id. at 1141 (holding First Amendment protection not triggered).
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video games[ ] and found no conveyance of ideas, expression, or
anything else that could possibly amount to speech."55 Judge
Limbaugh opined that video games, despite the story elements they
often contain, were more like bingo and blackjack or baseball and
hockey; each of which, he reasoned, is not sufficiently imbued with
expression to fall under the protection of the First Amendment.
56
In a nutshell, video games, from Limbaugh's perspective, simply
were not speech but conduct.
57
Judge Limbaugh went further in his decision upholding the St.
Louis County ordinance and denying the IDSA's motion for sum-
mary judgment. He wrote that even if video games constituted
speech for the purpose of the First Amendment, the ordinance
would nonetheless survive strict scrutiny.58 Applying that standard,
Judge Limbaugh held that:
The County has two compelling interests: 1) to protect the
physical and emotional health of the children in St. Louis
County, and 2) to assist parents to be the guardians of
their children's well-being. In addition, the Court finds
that the Ordinance is narrowly drawn to regulate only that
expression which is necessary to address the County's
compelling interests. 59
Finally, Judge Limbaugh rejected the IDSA's argument that the
law was unconstitutionally vague.60 Under the void for vagueness
doctrine, "[a] law is unconstitutionally vague if a reasonable person
cannot tell what speech is prohibited and what is permitted."61 The
55. Id. at 1134 (reporting on judge's review of video games).
56. Id. at 1134-35 (noting violence in video game does not impart expression
as element of game).
57. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 253 (2002) (" [T]he
Court's First Amendment cases draw vital distinctions between words and deeds,
between ideas and conduct."). Only that conduct deemed to be sufficiently sym-
bolic constitutes speech within the meaning of the First Amendment protection, as
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor wrote for a majority of the United States Supreme
Court in 2003 when addressing the act of cross burning as a form of speech, "[t] he
First Amendment affords protection to symbolic or expressive conduct as well as to
actual speech." Virginia v. Black, 123 S.Ct. 1536, 1547 (2003); see also Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974) (holding for conduct to constitute
speech, there must be "[a] n intent to convey a particularized message" and great
likelihood in surrounding circumstances "the message would be understood by
those who viewed it").
58. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1141.
59. Id.
60. See id. (concluding sufficient warning was conveyed).
61. ERWIN CHEMERNSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 763
(Aspen Law & Bus. 1997).
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IDSA contended that the terms "minors' morbid interest in vio-
lence," "graphic violence," and "patently offensive" used in the ordi-
nance were too vague. 6 2 Judge Limbaugh, however, noted that the
government had supplied a definition for each of these terms.63
For instance, the ordinance defined "minor" as a person under the
age of seventeen, and defined the term "graphic violence" as a "vis-
ual depiction or representation of realistic serious injury to a
human or human-like being where such serious injury includes am-
putation, decapitation, dismemberment, bloodshed, mutilation,
maiming or disfiguration." 64 Judge Limbaugh concluded that the
"language challenged sufficiently conveys a definite warning as to
the proscribed conduct" and, therefore, was not unconstitutionally
vague. 65
The Eighth Circuit court of appeals, however, would reverse
Judge Limbaugh's decision, just fourteen months later.66 This
time, with friend-of-the-court briefs filed on the IDSA's behalf by
prominent free speech organizations such as the American Civil
Liberties Union and the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protec-
tion of Free Expression, along with the opinion of Judge Posner in
Kendrick on the books, the IDSA prevailed.67
Writing on behalf of a unanimous three-judge panel, Judge
Morris Sheppard Arnold initially concluded that, contrary to Judge
Limbaugh's exceedingly narrow conception of speech, video games
are indeed a form of expression within the ambit of First Amend-
ment protection. 68 Citing Kendrick three times in just two pages to
support this conclusion, Judge Arnold expanded and built upon
Posner's reasoning that the interactivity element of video games
does not render them outside the scope of the First Amendment.69
Judge Arnold, including modem pop-cultural references to illus-
trate his point, wrote:
62. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, 200 F. Supp. 2d at 1139 (setting forth
plaintiff's claim).
63. See id. (describing ordinance's language as "much more precise" than
other statutes struck down previously).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1140 (emphasizing language's context in video game industry).
66. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 960
(8th Cir. 2003) (reversing lower court).
67. See id. at 955 (listing friend-of-the-court briefs filed on both sides). For a
further discussion of Kendrick, see supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
68. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, 329 F.3d at 957-58 (holding video
games are afforded First Amendment protection).
69. Id. at 957 (using Kendrick in court's analysis).
[Vol. 11: p. 203
12
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2004], Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol11/iss2/1
2004] 2003 LEGISLATIVE ASSAULT ON VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES 215
The County suggests in fact that with video games, the
story lines are incidental and players may skip the expres-
sive parts of the game and proceed straight to the player-
controlled action. But the same could be said of action-
packed movies like "The Matrix" or "Charlie's Angels"; any
viewer with a videocassette or DVD player could simply
skip to and isolate the action sequences. The fact that
modern technology has increased viewer control does not
render movies unprotected by the [F]irst [A]mendment,
and equivalent player control likewise should not automat-
ically disqualify modern video games .... 70
In concluding that video games constitute speech, Judge Ar-
nold also made a key point: First Amendment protection for speech
is not based or dependent on some abstract, qualitative judicial
judgment about how much literary or societal value that speech
holds. 71 As he put it, "[w]hether we believe the advent of violent
video games adds anything of value to society is irrelevant."72 This
language mirrors that of other cases involving expression in which
judges have not second-guessed First Amendment rights just be-
cause the speech itself was violent or offensive. 73 In addition, the
holding that video games deserve First Amendment protection
squares with other courts' acknowledgments that the "First Amend-
ment guaranties of freedom of speech and expression extend to all
artistic and literary expression, whether in music, concerts, plays, pic-
tures or books." 74 Recognizing that the medium of expression is
not determinative of First Amendment protection, Judge Arnold's
opinion simply adds video games to a laundry list of media artifacts
70. Id. at 957.
71. See id. at 958 (deeming societal value irrelevant).
72. Id.
73. For instance, in considering whether the late rap artist, Tupac Shakur,
should be held civilly liable to the family of Texas state trooper, Bill Davidson, who
was killed by a teenager who listened to Shakur's violent, anti-police messages on
the album 2Pacalypse Now, Judge John D. Rainey wrote:
2Pacalypse Now is both disgusting and offensive. That the album has sold
hundreds of thousands of copies is an indication of society's aesthetic and
moral decay. However, the First Amendment became part of the Consti-
tution because the Crown sought to suppress the Framers' own rebel-
lious, sometimes violent views. Thus, although the Court cannot
recommend 2Pacalypse Now to anyone, it will not strip Shakur's free
speech rights based on the evidence presented by the Davidsons.
Davidson v. Time Warner, Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21559, *71-72 (S.D. Tex.
1997).
74. McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 989, 999 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)
(emphasis added) (addressing plaintiffs claim thatJohn "Ozzy" Osbourne's music
was proximate cause of son's suicide).
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- a list that surely will continue to evolve and expand as technol-
ogy makes feasible more avenues and venues of storytelling in the
future.
Not only did the Eighth Circuit conclude that video games
constitute speech within'the scope of the First Amendment, it also
held that the St. Louis County ordinance could not survive under
the strict scrutiny standard of review.75 The court initially rejected
the government's argument that graphic violence should be treated
as obscenity.76 Traditionally, obscenity has fallen outside of the
scope of First Amendment protection. 77 Refusing to conflate vio-
lence with sex when the two subjects are not inextricably inter-
twined, Judge Arnold wrote, "[s] imply put, depictions of violence
cannot fall within the legal definition of obscenity for either minors
or adults." 78
It is important to note that this decision marked the second
time that governmental entities were judicially rebuked for arguing
that violence in video games should be treated as if it were concom-
itant with sexually explicit speech. 79 In Kendrick, the City of Indian-
apolis asked the Seventh Circuit "to squeeze the provision on
violence into a familiar legal pigeonhole, that of obscenity, which is
normally concerned with sex and is not protected by the First
75. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, 329 F.3d at 960 (deciding ordinance
did not survive strict scrutiny and not deciding whether ordinance is unconstitu-
tionally vague).
76. See id. (rejecting government's argument).
77. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (noting United States Su-
preme Court has adopted a three-part test for determining whether speech is ob-
scene). The test asks:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community
standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interest ... ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applica-
ble state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. (citations omitted); see also DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FiRsT AMENDMENT 127 (2d
ed. 2003) (writing "[o] ne of the traditional exceptions to First Amendment protec-
tion was for a category of content called obscenity" and observing "[o]bscenity
prosecutions have a long history in the United States").
78. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, 329 F.3d at 958.
79. Cf Ashley Vanarsdall, Federal Court Rules Regulations of Video Game Sales Un-
constitutiona4 Current News Releases, 19 (June 3, 2003), at http://www.idsa.com/
6_3_2003.html (applauding Eighth Circuit's holding in Interactive Software Ass'n).
The president of IDSA, Douglas Lowenstein, expressed hopes "that this ruling,
coupled with a similar ruling by the [S]eventh Circuit Court of Appeals [in Ken-
drick] will give pause to those who would use the power of the state to regulate
speech they find objectionable." Id.
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Amendment."80 Judge Posner, however, wrote-that "[v]iolence and
obscenity are distinct categories of objectionable depiction" 8' and
that the concerns that justify obscenity laws - protecting people
from offensive expression - are different from those that justify
laws against violent video games - protecting against "temporal
harm by engendering aggressive attitudes and behavior, which
might lead to violence." 82
The Seventh and Eight Circuit decisions not to treat violence
and obscenity in a similar fashion also dealt a blow to legal scholars
who claim the two forms of content should be treated in a compara-
ble manner. In particular, Professor Kevin Saunders recently ar-
gued in support of video game legislation in stating that
"[piroperly understood, the obscenity exception would be seen to
extend to sufficiently explicit and offensive depictions of vio-
lence." 83 Not surprisingly, given this belief and Professor Saunder's
further contention that there are at least three valid arguments "to
justify restricting the access of minors to violent video games,"84 he
drafted an amicus brief on behalf of an organization called the
Lion & Lamb Project 85 in support -of St. Louis County's
ordinance. 86
80. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 2.44 F.3d 572, 574 (7th Cir.
2001).
81. Id. (citation omitted).
82. Id. at 575.
83. Kevin W. Saunders, Regulating Youth Access to Violent Video Games: Three Re-
sponses to First Amendment Concerns, 2003 L. REv. MICH.ST.U.-DETROIT C.L. 51, 79
(2003) [hereinafter Three Responses]. Saunders, who teaches at Michigan State Uni-
versity-Detroit College of Law, contends that "[g]iven the history, both in drama
and law, the ordinary language uses of the term, and the inability to distinguish the
two under [F]irst [A]mendment theory, the law should allow a refocusing of the
obscenity exception to include violence." Id. at 87.. An extended version of Saun-
der's thesis can be found in a book he authored. See KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, VIOLENCE
AS OBSCENITY- LIMITING THE MEDIA'S FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION 3 (Duke Univ.
Press 1996) (arguing violent images should be treated like obscenity and contend-
ing "[v]iolence is at least as obscene as sex").
84. Saunders, Three Responses, supra note 83, at 61.
85. See The Lion & Lamb Project, at http://www.lionlamb.org (last visited June
2, 2004). The website of this organization states that "[t]he mission of The Lion &
Lamb Project is to Stop the marketing of violence to children. We do this by help-
ing parents, industry and government officials recognize that violence is not
child's play - and by galvanizing concerned adults to take action." Id.
86. See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Lion & Lamb Project In Support of the
Appellee and Supporting Affirmance, Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis
County, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003) (No. 02-3010), available at http://www.
lionlamb.org/brief pagel.htm.
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In attempting to treat violent content as if it were sexual con-
tent,8 7 both St. Louis County and the City of Indianapolis employed
the term "harmful to minors" in their respective ordinances. 88
Why? Because the United States Supreme Court previously had up-
held the use of so-called variable obscenity laws that also employed
the term "harmful to minors" in the context of restricting minors'
access to sexually explicit speech otherwise accessible to adults. 89
Both counties apparently hoped that they could borrow the term
"harmful to minors" from the area of sexually explicit speech, insert
the word "violence" into the definition of "harmful to minors" as it
was defined previously to apply only to sexual imagery,90 and
thereby gain the ability to regulate such violent content without in-
fringing upon the First Amendment.
In particular, St. Louis County, borrowing language from the
Supreme Court's now three-decade-old definition of obscenity,91
defined the term "harmful to minors" to mean a video game that
"predominantly appeals to minors' morbid interest in violence, ....
is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult community
as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors, lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value as a whole for
87. See Clay Calvert & Robert Richards, Larry Flynt Uncensored: A Dialogue With
the Most Controversial Figure in First Amendment Jurisprudence, 9 COMM. LAw CONSPEC-
TUS 159, 165 (2001). Treating violent and sexual content as if they were each
equally reprehensible should not be confused with the position of some who
would actually treat violent imagery as far worse than sexual content and who,
concomitantly, argue for the protection of sexually explicit speech. See id. For
instance, Larry Flynt, the flamboyant publisher of sexually explicit magazines in-
cluding Hustler and Barely Legal, finds it ironic that
"[y]ou can publish the most gory [sic] photographs on the front page of
a mutilated, decapitated body. You might even win the Pulitzer Prize for
it. But if you publish a photograph of two people making love, you may
go to jail. Now that says a lot about the priorities of a society that con-
dones violence and condemns sex."
Id.
88. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir.
2001) (noting ordinance forbids "use by minors of [ ] amusement machine that is
harmful to minors"); See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329
F.3d 954, 956 (8th Cir. 2003) (stating ordinance in question made it "unlawful to
... sell, rent, or make minors, or to 'permit the free play of' graphically violent
video games by minors, without a parent or guardian's consent").
89. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 663 (1968) (upholding New York
statute using term "harmful to minors" to restrict minors access to sexually explicit
speech otherwise non-obscene for adults).
90. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-49-2-2 (West 2003) (defining which matters
and performances are harmful to Indiana's minors, and defining such matters in
terms of "prurient interest in sex of minors" rather than in relation to violence,
which is not mentioned in statute).
91. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (setting forth three-part test
for obscenity currently used by United States Supreme Court).
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minors, and contains.., graphic violence." 92 Indianapolis had sim-
ilarly defined "harmful to minors" to mean:
an amusement machine that predominantly appeals to
minors' morbid interest in violence or minors' prurient
interest in sex, is patently offensive to prevailing standards
in the adult community as a whole with respect to what is
suitable material for persons under the age of eighteen
(18) years, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scien-
tific value as a whole for persons under the age of eigh-
teen (18) years, and: (1) Contains graphic violence; or,
(2) Contains strong sexual content.93
After rejecting St. Louis County's attempt to equate violence
with sex, Judge Arnold then analyzed whether the ordinance served
a compelling government interest in accordance with the strict
scrutiny standard of review. 94 The County asserted two interests,
which it argued were compelling: (1) "protecting the 'psychological
well-being of minors' by reducing the harm suffered by children
who play violent video games," 95; and (2) assisting parents in the
task of guarding their children's well-being. 96
While acknowledging that the "County's interest in safeguard-
ing the psychological well-being of minors is compelling in the ab-
stract,"97 Judge Arnold reasoned that there was no evidence to
demonstrate that the asserted harm in question - damage to the
psychological well-being of minors allegedly caused by playing vio-
lent video games - was even real.98 The judge wrote:
Before the County may constitutionally restrict the speech
at issue here, the County must come forward with empirical
support for its belief that 'violent' video games cause psy-
chological harm to minors. In this case... the County has
failed to present the 'substantial supporting evidence' of
harm that is required before an ordinance that threatens
protected speech can be upheld.99
92. St. Louis County, MO., Ordinance 20,193, § 602.425(c) (2000).
93. Indianapolis, IN., General Ordinance 72-2000, § 831-1 (2000).
94. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 958
(8th Cir. 2003) (applying strict scrutiny).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 959.
97. Id. at 958.
98. See id. at 959 (noting lack of empirical support for County's position).
99. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, 329 F.3d at 959 (emphasis added).
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The emphasized language above is critical. The Eighth Circuit
has now made it clear that phantom fears of supposedly powerful
media effects will not support or justify laws that restrict speech. 00
There must be solid evidence - "substantial supporting evidence"
and "empirical support," to use the court's own language - before
such laws can withstand judicial review. 10 1 Parsed differently and
more bluntly, the government must prove that an actual harm ex-
ists before it can regulate the media. If other courts outside the
Eighth Circuit adopt these or similarly stringent tests, then video
game ordinances will face a steep, uphill battle in the fight for
constitutionality.
Applying these tests of empirical and substantial evidence to
the evidence offered by St. Louis County, Judge Arnold wrote for
the Eighth Circuit:
The County's conclusion that there is a strong likelihood
that minors who play violent video games will suffer a dele-
terious effect on their psychological health is simply un-
supported in the record. It is true that a psychologist
appearing on behalf of the County stated that a recent
study that he conducted indicates that playing violent
video games "does in fact lead to aggressive behavior in
the immediate situation.., that more aggressive thoughts
are reported and there is frequently more aggressive be-
havior." But this vague generality falls far short of a show-
ing that video games are psychologically deleterious. The
County's remaining evidence included the conclusory
comments of county council members; a small number of
ambiguous, inconclusive, or irrelevant (conducted on
adults, not minors) studies; and the testimony of a high
school principal who admittedly had no information re-
garding any link between violent video games and psycho-
logical harm. 10 2
What is striking about this analysis is that, just as Judge Posner
and the Seventh Circuit had done in Kendrick, Judge Arnold and
the Eighth Circuit rejected the social science evidence offered by
the government to support a statute targeting violent video
100. See id. at 959-60 (recognizing "substantial supporting evidence" is
necessary).
101. See id. at 959.
102. Id. at 958-59.
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games.103 The court would not be blinded by social science, as it
recognized the studies in question were "ambiguous, inconclusive,
or irrelevant."'10 4 What were those studies? Who were their
authors?
Perhaps not surprisingly, the studies included some of the
same evidence relied upon unsuccessfully by the City of Indianapo-
lis in Kendrick.105 Judge Posner wrote in that case that "[t]he social
science evidence on which the City relies consists primarily of the
pair of psychological studies that we mentioned earlier, which are
reported in Craig A. Anderson & Karen E. Dill, 'Personality
Processes and Individual Differences - Video Games and Aggres-
sive Thoughts, Feelings, and Behavior in the Laboratory and in
Life.' "106 Judge Posner dismissed Anderson's studies for multiple
reasons, writing that:
Those studies do not support the ordinance. There is no
indication that the games used in the studies are similar to
those in the record of this case or to other games likely to
be marketed in game arcades in Indianapolis. The studies
do not find that video games have ever caused anyone to
commit a violent act, as opposed to feeling aggressive, or
have caused the average level of violence to increase any-
where. And they do not suggest that it is the interactive
character of the games, as opposed to the violence of the
images in them, that is the cause of the aggressive feelings.
The studies thus are not evidence that violent video games
are any more harmful to the consumer or to the public
safety than violent movies or other violent, but passive,
entertainments. 107
Despite Judge Posner's stern rebuke of the studies as irrele-
vant, St. Louis County nonetheless relied upon Professor Craig A.
Anderson of Iowa State University as its expert on the effects of
violent video games °108 Although it is not specified in either the
103. For further discussion of rejection of social science evidence in Kendrick,
see supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
104. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, 329 F.3d at 959. (questioning insuffi-
ciency of studies presented).
105. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 578-79 (7th
Cir. 2001) (analyzing social studies presented in case).
106. Id. at 578 (citation omitted).
107. Id. at 578-79 (emphasis in original).
108. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis Co., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1126,
1129 (reviewing expert's testimony). Dr. Craig Anderson, psychology professor at
Iowa State University, testified at hearings on the ordinance, and the court noted
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district or appellate court opinions which of Anderson's articles the
County relied upon, Judge Limbaugh wrote that "one of the articles
is the publication of Dr. Anderson's study, and Dr. Anderson could
testify in court regarding this study because he has personal knowl-
edge in conducting it."109
When viewed together, the rejection of social science evidence
at the appellate court level in both American Amusement Machine As-
sociation and Interactive Digital Software Association should signal the
death knell for the use of current, general social science research
on video games to support access-limitation ordinances. After all,
Professor Anderson has been described as "the nation's pre-emi-
nent researcher on the effect of exposure to violent video
games,"" l0 yet even his research could not help to support access-
limitation legislation."' For future research to be useful and rele-
vant to cities and states that want to suppress minors' access to
video games, the studies must involve minors (not college students
or adults), must involve the specific games that are regulated (not
violent games generally), must not be conducted in artificial labora-
tory settings that are so far removed from reality that they lack all
external validity, 112 and must prove actual causation (not merely
that "[i]n his testimony, Dr. Anderson referred to studies which found that violent
video games caused psychological damage to children. St. Louis County provided
the Court a copy of the studies referred to by Dr. Anderson." See id.
109. Id. at 1129 n.1. Elsewhere in Limbaugh's opinion, he noted that "Dr.
Anderson testified regarding a study in which he and Dr. Brad Bushman had just
completed concerning the playing of violent video games. He told the Council that
they found that playing violent video games for as short of a time as [ten] to [fif-
teen] minutes does in fact lead to aggressive behavior in the immediate situation."
Id. at 1137. Judge Limbaugh failed to note whether this study had actually been
published in article form in an academic journal. See id. (failing to state whether
article was published).
The authors of this law journal article, however, were able to locate two arti-
cles co-authored by Anderson and Bushman that summarize their research find-
ings. See Craig A. Anderson & Brad J. Bushman, Effects of Violent Video Games on
Aggressive Behavior, Aggressive Cognition, Aggressive Affect, Physiological Arousal, and
Prosocial Behavior: A Meta-Analytic Review of the Scientific Literature, 12 PSYCHOL. SCI.
353 (2001); BradJ. Bushman & Craig A. Anderson, Media Violence and the American
Public: Scientific Facts Versus Media Misinformation, 56 AM. PSYCHOL. 477 (2001).
110. Barbara F. Meltz, Child Caring; Legislation Would Target Violence in Video
Games, BOSTON GLOBE, May 22, 2003, at Hl, H8 (recognizing Professor Anderson's
qualifications).
111. See E.D. Fletcher, Bills to Target Violent Games, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 29,
2003, at http://www.sacbee.com/content/politics/story/7869056p-8809136c.html
(discussing legislator's attempt to use social science research to back access-limita-
tion legislation). California Assemblyman Leland Yee, who holds a Ph.D. in child
psychology, justified the legislation by stating: "[t]his is all about saving our kids."
Id.
112. SeeJAMEs H. WATT & SJEF A. VAN DER BERG, RESEARCH METHODS FOR COM-
MUNICATION SCIENCE 241 (1995) (noting generalizability, or external validity, of
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correlation)11 3 of violent conduct (not merely attitude change or
aggressive tendencies).11 4 Whether such specific studies can ever
be produced is highly doubtful, especially given the fact that there
is now an active body of thirty-three media scholars who have
banded together to file an amicus brief on behalf of the IDSA that
criticized the current state of social science research, including that
of Professor Craig A. Anderson, used by both St. Louis County and
the City of Indianapolis.1 15 Surely, in future cases, that group will
be present and ready to criticize similar studies when they are
presented to support a supposedly compelling interest in prevent-
ing harm to minors allegedly caused by video games.1 16
The Eighth Circuit also rejected, as non-compelling, St. Louis
County's second asserted interest behind its video game ordinance:
helping parents to better serve as guardians of their children's well-
being.11 7 Writing that "the government cannot silence protected
research is "the ability of its conclusions to be validly extended from the specific
environment in which the research study is conducted to similar 'real world' situa-
tions"). Data obtained from an externally valid study is superior, as it can be used
to predict behavior. See id. at 241-42.
113. See generally MICHAEL SINGLETARY, MASS COMMUNICATION RESEARCH: CON-
TEMPORARY METHODS AND APPLICATIONS 227 (1994) (writing "[i]t is important to
recognize that correlation is not the same as causation. In other words, if two
variables are corTelated, it does not necessarily follow that one causes any change in
the other") (emphasis in original).
114. See generally Violence, supra note 6, at 18-20 (examining issues of causation
versus correlation, problems with generalized and aggregated data, and sometimes
inconsistent link between knowledge, attitude, and behavior).
115. Brief of Amici Curiae of Thirty-Three Media Scholars In Support of Ap-
pellants, and Supporting Reversal, Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis
County, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003) (on file with authors).
116. See Michael Rich, Testimony on neurobiological research and the impact
of media and children before the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation
Committee (Apr. 10, 2003) (transcript on file with authors). That the current
body of media-effects research demonstrating a correlation between viewing vio-
lent images and subsequent aggressive behavior is subject to criticism was made
clear in the testimony of Dr. Michael Rich before the Senate Commerce, Science
and Transportation Committee in April 2003. See id. Dr. Rich, who practices pedi-
atrics and adolescent medicine at Children's Hospital Boston, teaches at Harvard
Medical School and Harvard School of Public Health, and directs the Center on
Media and Child Health at Harvard University, told members of the committee
that:
[d]espite the preponderance and strength of findings that associate me-
dia exposure with increased aggression, fears, and desensitization to vio-
lence, the mechanism by which media actually changes those who are
exposed remains unclear. Without a step-by-step understanding of how
viewed violence is translated into perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors,
the media exposure and effects research remains open to criticism.
Id.
117. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954,
960 (8th Cir. 2003) (holding under circumstances of case county may not aid par-
ents by restricting First Amendment Rights).
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speech by wrapping itself in the cloak of parental authority,"'1 18 the
Eighth Circuit reasoned that "[t]o accept the County's broadly-
drawn interest as a compelling one would be to invite legislatures to
undermine the [F]irst [A]mendment rights of minors willy-nilly
under the guise of promoting parental authority."'1 19 As with Judge
Posner in Kendrick, it is respect for the First Amendment rights of
children and not just those of the manufacturers and producers of
video games that ultimately led to the demise of St. Louis County's
efforts.
What surely must be frustrating for video game opponents
about this staunch judicial respect for minors' First Amendment
rights of free speech, when pitted against alleged interests in paren-
tal authority, is that it contradicts what courts have been doing post-
Columbine to the free speech rights of minors in another setting:
schools. 120 As University of Southern California constitutional law
scholar Erwin Chemerinsky observed in October 2002, "[clourts
have very much overreacted in deferring to schools in situations
where there's really no justification for restricting speech. First
Amendment rights have been tremendously jeopardized."'a21
Across the country, minors in public schools are losing court battles
over their free speech rights. 122 The disturbing irony for anti-video
game advocates is that while the in loco parentis power of schools is
increasing with respect to restricting the right of minors to engage
in free speech, the power of parents themselves is decreasing with
118. Id. The court continued:
[W]e are guided by the Supreme Court's recognition that "[s]peech that
is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to some other legitimate pro-
scription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young from ideas or
images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them. In most circum-
stances, the values protected by the First Amendment are no less applica-
ble when the government seeks to control the flow of information to
minors."
Id. (quoting Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975)).
119. Id. The court did accept the County's interest "in safeguarding the psy-
chological wellbeing of minors" as "Compelling in the abstract." Id. at 958.
120. For a discussion of court rulings on minors' free speech rights in schools,
see infra note 122 and accompanying text.
121. Mike McKee, Bad Men on Campus, RECORDER, Oct. 31, 2002, at News.
122. See, e.g., Doe v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist., 306 F.3d 616, 619 (8th
Cir. 2002) (holding school did not violate studentJosh Mahan's First Amendment
free speech right by expelling him for writing an allegedly threatening note about
another student); J.S. v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 807 A.2d 847, 850 (Pa. 2002)
(holding school did not violate First Amendment rights of student Justin Swidler
by expelling him for home-created website containing "derogatory, profane, offen-
sive[,] and threatening statements directed toward one of the student's teachers
and his principal").
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respect to their ability to control the speech to which their children
are exposed. 123
And St. Louis County legislators are, indeed, frustrated. 124 Af-
ter the Eighth Circuit's June 2003 ruling striking down the ordi-
nance that he first proposed back in October 2000, former
Councilman Jeff Wagener wrote an opinion column for the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch.125 In the column, Wagener contended that the
Eighth Circuit "made losers out of parents, who are trying to foster
their children's well-being." 126 He claimed the ordinance "struck
the right balance between the rights of the gainers to sell their
products and the rights of parents who want to control what their
kids are exposed to."'12 7 Wagener conveniently forgot to ever men-
tion in his column that someone else, "children, with their First
Amendment right to receive speech," also had rights that were at
stake in the case. 128 A further examination of the rhetoric and
sophistry used by Wagener and other proponents of access-limita-
tion legislation is reserved for Part III of this article. 129
Ultimately, after the Eighth Circuit denied the St. Louis
County Council's request for a rehearing of the case, the Council
decided not to petition the United States Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari. 130 The reasons were, in part, financial. 131 As St. Louis
County Council chairman Greg Quinn told a newspaper reporter,
123. For a discussion of parents' decreasing power, see infra notes 123-28 and
accompanying text.
124. See Beholder, supra note 1, at D6 (noting St. Louis County officials filed
appeal); see also Larry Copeland, Battle Over Violent Video Games Heating Up: Washing-
ton Case May Help Define Limits on Sales to Children, USA TODAY, Jan. 29, 2004, at A3
(detailing proposed access-limitation laws across country). Washington State Rep-
resentative Mary Lou Dickerson argues that access-limitation legislation is not cen-
sorship. See id. Dickerson states: "[t]here is a great deal of precedent for
restricting dangerous things like alcohol and tobacco to minors .... " Id.
125. Jeff Wagener, Score One for Violence, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, June 9,
2003, at B7 (describing Eighth Circuit's ruling as "a blow to parents who want to be
able to control what their children are exposed to in an increasingly violent
society").
126. Id. Wagener argues that consent requirements "help parents carry out
the responsibility of raising their children." Id.
127. Id. Wagener claims that "[w]e should not have to wait for more evi-
dence, or for more children to be harmed, before we take reasonable steps to
protect them." Id.
128. See id. (discussing effect of Eighth Circuit's ruling on parents).
129. See infra notes 301-74 and accompanying text.
130. See Michelle Kowalski, 8th U.S. Circuit Court Rules That Violent Video Games
Have First Amendment Protection, ST. Louis DAILY REcoR.D, Sept. 2, 2003 (discussing
Eighth Circuit's 2003 ruling striking down St. Louis County ordinance).
131. Id. (discussing St. Louis County councils' reason for not appealing
Eighth Circuit decision).
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"[t] here are costs involved in any step in the process of appealing.
We felt that since the [Eighth] Circuit made the decision the way
they did that it was something best just not to pursue." 132
With the victories for children's First Amendment rights in
both American Amusement Machine Association and Interactive Digital
Software Association in mind, this article now turns to the July 2003
battle over minors' access to violent video games in the state of
Washington. Although the Washington law was different from
those at issue in earlier cases, the judicial outcome would ultimately
be the same.
B. Video Software Dealers Association v. Maleng
In May 2003, a group of Washington lawmakers, led by Repre-
sentative Mary Lou Dickerson, a Democrat from Seattle, success-
fully passed a bill designed to block the sale or rental to children
under seventeen years of age of a "video or computer game that
contains realistic or photographic-like depictions of aggressive con-
flict in which the player kills, injures, or otherwise causes physical
harm to a human form in the game who is depicted, by dress or
other recognizable symbols, as a public law enforcement officer.' 133
Dickerson pompously proclaimed in a press release, "I'm proud
Washington is the first state to say we have a compelling interest in
keeping these ultra-violent games out of the hands of children with-
out their parents' consent."' 34
Just hours after Washington Governor Gary Locke signed the
measure into law, the IDSA 135 vowed to challenge the law, calling it
an "unconstitutional infringement on minors' rights. ' 13 6 The IDSA
joined forces with other representatives of the video and computer
software industry, led by the Encino, California-based Video
132. Id. (providing explanation for decision not to appeal).
133. H.R. 1009, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003). The bill authorizes a se-
ries of fines for breaking the law. See id. A complete legislative history of this bill
can be found on the Washington State Legislature website. See http://www.leg.wa.
gov/wsladm/billinfo/dspBillSummary.cfm?billnumber1009 (last visited Mar. 29,
2004).
134. Press Release, Locke Signs Video-Game Violence Law; First State Law in
the Nation to Regulate Sales of Violent Games to Minors, at http://hdc.leg.wa.
gov/members/dickerson/vgsigned.asp (last visited Aug. 27, 2003).
135. For a discussion of IDSA, see supra note 49 and accompanying text.
136. Dan Richman, Law Limits Some Violent Video Games, SErATr POST-INTELLI.
GENCER, May 21, 2003, at BI (noting "Washington's new law is more narrowly
drawn than many and so is more likely to survive judicial scrutiny"). "To survive,
laws restricting expression must be very narrow in their scope and serve a legiti-
mate purpose." Id. at B5.
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Software Dealers Association ("VSDA"),' 37 on June 5, 2003, to en-
join enforcement of the law, which was touted to be the first of its
kind in the country.138
The challenged provision was just the latest wrinkle in a more
comprehensive legislative initiative that empowered the state,
under its "duty to protect the public health and safety, ' 139 to regu-
late electronic media "uses of virtual reality . . . conducive to in-
creased violent behaviors, especially in children." 140 In similar
fashion, the challenged bill was predicated upon a legislative find-
ing that showed "a correlation between exposure to violent video
and computer games and various forms of hostile and anti-social
behavior. 141 As discussed previously in this article, correlation
142
and causation are two wholly different concepts, and courts have
recognized this distinction in the video and computer game
context.1
43
The Washington law was unique in that it defined as "violent"
only those games that depict aggressive tactics against public law
137. See Press Release, VSDA Releases Annual Report on the Home Entertain-
ment Industry, Aug. 4, 2003, at http://www.vsda.org/Resource.phx/public/press/
august2003/august04-03.htx. In addition to the Video Software Dealers Associa-
tion and the Interactive Digital Software Association, the other plaintiffs were the
Washington Retail Association, Interactive Entertainment Merchants Association,
International Game Developers Association, and the Hollywood Entertainment
Corporation. See id.
The VSDA describes itself in a recent press release available on its website as:
the not-for-profit international trade association for the $20 billion home
entertainment industry. VSDA represents more than 1,500 companies
throughout the United States, Canada, and a dozen other countries. Its
members operate more than 12,500 retail outlets in the U.S. that sell
and/or rent DVDs, VHS cassettes, and console video games. Membership
comprises the full spectrum of video retailers (from single-store operators
to large chains), video distributors, the home video divisions of major and
independent motion picture studios, and other related businesses that
constitute and support the home video entertainment industry.
Id.
138. See Richman, supra note 136, at BI (describing Washington's Videogame
Violence Bill). "To enforce the new law, police officers can issue a ticket on the
spot if they witness an unlawful sale or rental, or the can go into court, file a writ-
ten statement and obtain a ticket from the court, which they then deliver to the
alledged wrongdoer." Id. at B5.
139. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.188.010 (2003).
140. Id.
141. H.R. 1009, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Wash. 2003).
142. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 9, Video Software
Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, (W.D. Wash. 2003) (No. C03-1245L) (observing "these
games are singled out for censorship because they are allegedly correlated with
'various forms of hostile and anti-social behavior' and reduce 'respect for public
law enforcement officers'").
143. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
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enforcement officers, rather than including all violent content. 144
VSDA argued that the narrow focus of the law amounted to regula-
tion based solely upon the content and viewpoint of the speech. 145
To reach that constitutional argument, however, VSDA needed to
reinforce the threshold notion that video and computer games de-
served protection under the First Amendment.
VSDA compared the speech-like nature of these games to
other media to argue that they are "as expressive as film, music, and
the fine arts, each of which is unquestionably entitled to full First
Amendment protection." 146 Citing Kendrick147 and borrowing from
the 1DSA case discussed above, VSDA further argued that "[t] he fact
that video games are a relatively new medium of expression makes
them no less protected."1 48
Given the emphasis solely on violence depicted against law en-
forcement personnel, the state of Washington sought to restrict
video and computer games with a specific anti-law enforcement
bias.149 In contrast, positive portrayals of law enforcement officers
in video games were not regulated by the law.' 50 For instance, the
law did not restrict access to games in which a police officer shoots
a criminal.1 51 VSDA viewed this legislative approach as the state's
effort "to regulate a particular category of disfavored expression
based on that expression's message and alleged impact on its view-
ers."' 52 It further argued that basing a law on the content of speech
or, "more perniciously.., the viewpoint expressed by the games"' 53
required "exacting First Amendment scrutiny.' 15 4
144. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
145. See Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 10, Video Software
Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, (W.D. Wash. 2003) (No. C03-1245L).
146. Id. at 8.
147. See supra notes 38-45, 67, 69, 80-82, 103, 105 and accompanying text
(summarizing Kendrick opinion and its influence).
148. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 8, Video Software Deal-
ers Ass'n v. Maleng, (W.D. Wash. 2003) (No. C03-1245L).
149. See H.R. 1009, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(4) (Wash. 2003). The Washing-
ton statute only restricts violent video games where "the player kills, injures, or
otherwise causes physical harm to ... a public law enforcement officer." See id.
150. See id. (noting law proscribes violent acts only against law enforcement
officers). "At least 30 video games portray the killing of police officers .....
Richman, supra note 136, at B5.
151. See H.R. 1009, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 2(4) (Wash. 2003). The bill's defi-
nition of a "violent video or computer game" does not include games where per-
sons other than police officers were killed or injured. Id.
152. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 9, Video Software Deal-
ers Ass'n v. Maleng, (W.D. Wash. 2003) (No. C03-1245L).
153. Id. at 11.
154. Id. at 10.
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The United States Supreme Court has described viewpoint-
based discrimination as "an egregious form of content discrimina-
tion."'155 As Stanford University Law School Dean Kathleen Sullivan
and her late colleague Professor Gerald Gunther observed, "[t]he
Court generally treats restriction of the expression of a particular
point of view as the paradigm violation of the First Amendment.
156
The Court has embraced the concept of viewpoint neutrality,
157
while viewpoint discrimination has been scorned.
158
According to VSDA, the state failed to demonstrate a compel-
ling governmental need because the interests asserted by the legis-
lature, "curb [ing] hostile and antisocial behavior"'159 and "fostering
respect for public law enforcement officers," 160 did not approach "a
constitutionally sufficient rationale." 16' Moreover, VSDA ques-
tioned the legitimacy of the state attempting to foster respect for
itself: "[t]he government cannot suppress speech because it com-
municates a message of 'disrespect' for the government and its
agents.' 62 VSDA convincingly argued that the state fell short of
meeting the strict scrutiny standard required for such an infringe-
ment on expression. 163
In an opinion solidifying the First Amendment protection of
the computer and video game industry, U.S. District Judge Robert
S. Lasnik enjoined the state of Washington from enforcing its new
law, finding that the games presented as evidence to the court
155. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829
(1995). The Court stated "[w]hen the government targets not subject matter, but
particular views taken by speakers on a subject, the violation of the First Amend-
ment is all the more blatant." Id. (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391
(1992)).
156. KATHLEEN M. SULLVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 193
(2d ed. 2003). Sullivan and Gunther identify viewpoint restrictions as a subtype of
content-based regulation. See id.
157. See Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217,
233-34 (2000) (discussing favorably principle of viewpoint neutrality in context of
First Amendment jurisprudence surrounding distribution of mandatory student
activity fees at public universities).
158. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37,
62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its
purest form and government regulation that discriminates among viewpoints
threatens the continued validity of 'free speech.'").
159. H.R. 1009, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Wash. 2003).
160. Id.
161. Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 12, Video Software Deal-
ers Ass'n v. Maleng, (W.D. Wash. 2003) (No. C03-1245L).
162. Id. at 15.
163. See Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 6,
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, (W.D. Wash. 2003) (No. C03-1245L) (dis-
cussing less restrictive alternatives as element of strict scrutiny analysis).
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"[were] expressive and qualify as speech for purposes of the First
Amendment."164 Judge Lasnik pointed out that video games have
come a long way toward being considered expression deserving of
First Amendment protection, noting "early generations of video
games may have lacked the requisite expressive element, being little
more than electronic board games or computerized races."1 65 To-
day's games, on the other hand, "frequently involve intricate, if ob-
noxious, story lines, detailed artwork, original scores, and a
complex narrative which evolves as the player makes choices and
gains experience." 166 The judge's finding required that regulation
of the games' content meet the demands of the strict scrutiny
test. 167
Judge Lasnik noted that the state, in its response to VSDA's
motion, apparently abandoned the stated legislative interest of fos-
tering respect for law enforcement "in favor of a 'public safety' fo-
cus."1 68 The judge focused on the inferences the legislature drew
from the studies it gathered as the basis for the bill, finding that
"[in] ost of the studies on which the legislature relied evaluated the
effects of portrayals of violence in media other than video games or
studied effects on persons outside the targeted group."1 69 Not sur-
prisingly, similar to the Seventh Circuit in Kendrick and the Eighth
Circuit in !DSA, Judge Lasnik rejected the social science research of
Professor Anderson. 170
Moreover, Judge Lasnik questioned the logic of targeting only
"a single type of violent representation (harm to identifiable law
enforcement officers) in a single medium (video games)" without
considering "the total amount of violence to which minors are ex-
posed" or even attempting "to regulate all of the graphic violence
164. See id. at 6.
165. Id. at 3.
166. Id. at 3-4.
167. See id. at 4 (noting state may regulate speech "to serve a compelling state
interest" if regulation is "narrowly tailored"); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505
U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (holding content-based regulations presumptively invalid).
168. Id. at 5.
169. Order Granting Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 6-7,
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, (W.D. Wash. 2003) (No. C03-1245L) (not-
ing one study used by legislature examined effects on college students). Because
studies relied on by the state legislature informing the remedy do not focus on
minors, it is unlikely that the state can show its remedy will allieviate the identified
problem with minors. See id. at 7.
170. See id. at 7-8 (rejecting article published by Anderson and co-author in
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology).
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depicted in video games."'171 Parsed differently, the law is underin-
clusive in terms of serving its stated purpose. 172
Judge Lasnik also reasoned that the law simply would not "alle-
viate the identified problem. 1 73 Viewed another way, if the state's
interest was designed to keep violent content away from minors, the
law would fail because the measure would have "no effect at all on
the other channels through which violent representations are
presented to children," and even violent video games would not be
restricted, as "only those involving police officers would be off-lim-
its." 174 Judge Lasnik also pointed out that the law could "sweep too
broadly" if the legislature intended to restrict "access to only the
most vile portrayals of violence" because it would necessarily keep
minors away from "games which mirror mainstream movies or re-
flect heroic struggles against corrupt regimes, such as 'Minority Re-
port: Everybody Runs."175
Judge Lasnik found that, given the serious constitutional ques-
tions raised by the challengers of the Act, allowing the state to en-
force the law - one that may very well be declared unconstitutional
after a full hearing on the merits - would exact irreparable harm,
even in the short-term loss of First Amendment rights. 176
His opinion was immediately lauded by the VSDA. 177 Bo An-
derson, president of the VSDA, called the decision "a victory for the
First Amendment rights of video retailers and their customers. It
affirms that the government cannot restrict access to video games,
even those that are - in the court's words - 'obnoxious,' just be-
cause it doesn't like the messages they contain."' 78
171. Id. at 7.
172. See id. (noting Act regulating videogames will not meet purpose of curb-
ing violent behavior in minors because children can receive violent media in other
ways). For a discussion of underinclusiveness, see Richland Bookmart, Inc. v. Nich-
ols, 278 F.3d 570, 574-75 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S. Ct. 109 (2002) ("The
underinclusiveness of a law will violate the First Amendment where the proof es-
tablishes that the statute in question is intended to restrict disfavored expressive
content while exempting the expression of favored content.").
173. See Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 7,
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, (W.D. Wash. 2003) (No. C03-1245L) (not-
ing violence in all media is not regulated by law).
174. Id. at 7-8.
175. Id. at 8.
176. See id. ("The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal peri-
ods of time, unquestionable constitutes irreparable injury.").
177. See Press Release, Statement of VSDA Regarding Favorable Ruling in
Challenge to Washington State Video Game Censorship Law, July 11, 2003, at
http://www.vsda.org/Resource.phx/public/press/july2003/julyl 1-03.htx.
178. Id.
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Despite Anderson's pronouncement, the twin First Amend-
ment victories in the 2003 opinions described in this part of the
article, and the earlier pro-First Amendment decision in Kendrick,
legislators keep churning out bills targeting video games and, in
particular, minors' access to them. The next part of this article ad-
dresses some of those measures, critiquing their constitutionality -
or, better put, their "unconstitutionality" - in light of the decisions
addressed above.
II. FIRING BLANKS AT VIOLENT VIDEO GAMES: A REVIEW AND
CRITIQUE OF THE LEGISLATIVE LANDSLIDE
It is ironic that a favorite target of the proponents of legislation
restricting minors' access to video games is the genre of so-called
first-person-shooter video games 179 that supposedly train young
boys to shoot real people with deadly accuracy. 180 When it comes
to drafting legislation that can pass constitutional muster, however,
these anti-access advocates cannot seem to shoot straight. Instead,
they consistently fire legislative blanks or miss the mark.1 81 The
only thing left dead after judicial review is the legislation itself.
This part of the article examines several examples of legislation
pending in 2003 to determine whether legislators are improving
their drafting skills when it comes to crafting anti-access video game
legislation. In particular, four bills are examined: one federal
bill,182 along with legislation from the states of Delaware,' s3 Minne-
179. See Mike Snider, 'Doom'Returns in All its Gory, USA TODAY, May 12, 2003,
at ID [hereinafter Doom Returns]. This is a genre of video game, exemplified by
the game Doom, "in which players see through the eyes of heavily armed characters
as they fire their way through enemy-filled levels." Id. Adding to the irony is that
these often-criticized games - Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, who committed the
violence at Columbine High School, played the game Doom - actually have been
shown to have positive effects in sharply improving visual attention skills and lead-
ing to an "increase the brain's capacity to spread attention over a wide range of
events." Sandra Blakeslee, Video-Game Killing Builds Visual Skills, Researchers Report,
N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2003, at Al; see also Steve Galpern, 'Doom' Gurus Unmasked,
RocKy MOUNTAIN NEWS, May 30, 2003, at 25D (describing how after it was revealed
Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold had played Doom, first-person shooter games were
condemned for causing real-life violence).
180. See Doom Returns, supra note 179, at ID (noting first-person shooter
games may train players for real-life shooting).
181. For a description of how anti-access measures have been declared uncon-
stitutional and enjoined in three separate cases, see supra notes 37-178 and accom-
panying text (Part I).
182. See H.R. 669, 108th Cong. (2003) ("To amend [T]itle 18, United States
Code, to prohibit the sale or rental of adult video games to minors.").
183. See H.R. 221, 142d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2003) ("An Ace to
amend Title 11 of Delaware Code Relating to Obscenity.").
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sota,' 8 4 and Pennsylvania. 8 5 These bills were selected because they
each embody a different method of regulation, including different
definitions of the content to which minors' access is restricted.18 6
Section A sets forth the text of each of these bills, drawing com-
parisons and contrasts where relevant. 18 7 Section B articulates the
legislative history behind the bills in those cases where there is a
clear record.'88 Finally, Section C analyzes and critiques each of
these measures for its constitutionality. 18 9 In particular, Section C
compares current legislation to that of Indianapolis, St. Louis
County, and Washington State, all of which were previously en-
joined for violating the First Amendment. Whereas some of the
bills described below restrict access to video games involving both
sexual and violent content, this article focuses only on those parts
of the bills relating to violent content and imagery. A discussion of
the regulation of sexual content in video games is beyond the scope
of this article.
A. Recent Legislation
This section looks initially at a federal bill designed to restrict
minors' access to video games. It then turns to legislation pending
in Delaware, Minnesota, and Pennsylvania.
1. The Federal Legislation
The "Protect Children from Video Game Sex and Violence Act
of 2003" provides, in relevant part, "[w]hoever sells at retail or
rents, or attempts to sell at retail or rent, to a minor any video game
that depicts nudity, sexual conduct, or other content harmful to mi-
nors, shall be fined under this chapter." 90 It is the term "harmful
to minors" that addresses violent content in this bill and is defined
to mean:
video game content that predominantly appeals to mi-
nors' morbid interest in violence or minors' prurient interest
in sex, is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the
184. See S. 35, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2003-04) (banning sale or rental of
violent video games to minors).
185. See S. 822, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (prohibiting minors'
access to violent video games).
186. For a discussion of various definitional differences in each bill, see infra
notes 190-224 and accompanying text.
187. See infra notes 190-224 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 225-48 and accompanying text.
189. See infra notes 249-300 and accompanying text.
190. H.R. 669, 108th Cong. § 2732 (2003) (emphasis added).
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adult community as a whole with respect to what is suita-
ble material for minors, and lacks serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value for minors, and contains -
(A) graphic violence, (B) sexual violence, or (C) strong sexual
content.191
Within this definition of "harmful to minors" there are several
other terms that are also defined in the bill, including "minor,"
which is defined as "a person age 17 and younger."'192 In addition,
the term "graphic violence" is defined as "the visual depiction of
serious injury to human beings, actual or virtual, including aggra-
vated assault, decapitation, dismemberment, or death.' 93 Finally,
"sexual violence" is defined as "the visual depiction, actual or vir-
tual, of rape or other sexual assault."'19
4
At this point, it is critical to note that the proposed federal
legislation uses the term "harmful to minors" to define the re-
stricted violent content. 19 5 This particular strategy and term was
also used by both the City of Indianapolis 96 and St. Louis
County. 197 As noted in Part I of this article, those two ordinances
were declared unconstitutional by different federal appellate
courts.' 9 8 Such judicial history calls into question the constitution-
ality of the "Protect Children from Video Game Sex and Violence
191. Id. § 2731(2) (emphasis added).
192. Id. § 2731(3).
193. Id. § 2731(1).
194. Id. § 2731(7).
195. See H.R. 669, 108th Cong. § 2731(2) (2003) (emphasis added).
196. See Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kentlrick, 115 F. Supp. 2d 943, 946
(S.D. Ind. 2000), rev'd., 244 F.3d 572, 573 (7th Cir. 2001). The City of Indianapolis
used the term "harmful to minors" and defined it to mean:
an amusement machine that predominantly appeals to minors' morbid
interest in violence or minors' prurient interest in sex, is patently offen-
sive to prevailing standards in the adult community as a whole with re-
spect to what is suitable material for persons under the age of eighteen
(18) years, lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value as a
whole for persons under the age of eighteen (18) years, and: (1) Con-
tains graphic violence; or (2) Contains strong sexual content.
Id.
197. See Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d
1126, 1130 (E.D. Mo. 2002), rev'd., 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003). St. Louis County
also used the term " 'harmful to minors"' to mean:
a video game that 'predominantly appeals to minors' morbid interest in
violence', 'is patently offensive to prevailing standards in the adult com-
munity as a whole with respect to what is suitable material for minors,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value as a whole for
minors, and contains.., graphic violence.'
Id.
198. See supra notes 37-178 and accompanying text (Part I).
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Act of 2003." In fact, the Act's definition of "harmful to minors"
directly mirrors the language, which was unsuccessfully used by the
City of Indianapolis. 199
2. The Delaware Legislation
Delaware House Bill No. 221, which was introduced in June
2003, provides, in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for a person to sell at retail or rent or
attempt to sell at retail or rent, to (1) a person under the
age of 17 any video game with an official rating of "M" for
mature audiences or (2) a person under the age of 18 any
video game with an official rating of "AO" for adult only
audiences. A person attempting to purchase or rent a
video game rated for mature or adults only audiences shall
be required to show an identification card that provides a
date of birth.200
In contrast to the federal bill previously described, the Dela-
ware legislation does not use the "harmful to minors" concept in
defining the video games to which it applies. Rather, it uses the
video game industry's own voluntary ratings guidelines - "M"
("MATURE: Content may be suitable for persons ages 17 and older.
May contain mature sexual themes or more intense violence or lan-
guage") 20 1 and "AO" ("ADULTS ONLY: Content suitable only for
adults. May include graphic depictions of sex and/or violence.
Not intended for persons under the age of 18")202 - against the
industry. Stated differently, Delaware essentially is transforming a
voluntary system that was designed by the Entertainment Software
Ratings Board "only to give consumers objective and independent
information about game content, so they can make informed
purchasing decisions"20 3 into a legal weapon that will be used to
199. See supra note 93 and accompanying text (setting forth Indianapolis' def-
inition of "harmful to minors"). The only real difference being semantic - Indi-
anapolis defined a minor as "persons under the age of eighteen (18) years," see
supra note 93, while the federal legislation applies to "a person age [seventeen]
and younger." H.R. 669, 108th Cong. § 2731(3) (2003). These definitions, of
course, mean the exact same thing; persons under the age of eighteen are the
same people who are age seventeen and younger.
200. H.R. 221, 142d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2003).
201. ESRB Game Ratings, Game Rating & Descriptor Guide, Entertainment
Software Ratings Board ("ESRB"), at http://www.esrb.org/esrbratings-guide.asp
(last visited Mar. 29, 2004) [hereinafter ESRB Guide].
202. Id.
203. ESRB Game Ratings: Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.esrb.org/
esrbratingsfaqs.asp (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
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attack that industry. The self-regulation guidelines are being
turned into state law. 204 In turn, the video game industry is being
penalized for voluntarily supplying information to consumers.
The easy way out is for video game companies not to submit
their games for voluntary ratings. The Delaware legislation, how-
ever, wisely anticipates this potential skirting of the potential law by
providing that:
No owner, operator or employee of a business shall sell,
rent or otherwise provide to another a video game unless
the official rating of the video game is clearly displayed on
the outside of its cassette, case jacket or other covering. If
the video game has no official rating, the video game shall
be clearly and prominently marked as "not rated.
20 5
Finally, the legislation makes any violation of the proposed statute a
Class A misdemeanor.20
6
3. The Minnesota Legislation
Minnesota Senate Bill No. 35, introduced in January 2003 and
referred to the Commerce and Utilities Committee at that time,
provides that "[n]o person may sell or rent a restricted video game
to a person under 17 years of age,"20 7 and defines "restricted video
game" as "a video game rated AO or M by the Entertainment
Software Rating Board."20 8 The bill takes the same track as that
followed in Delaware, to the extent that it uses the video game in-
dustry's own voluntary ratings guidelines as the legal yardstick
against which restricted content is to be judged.
There is, however, a critical age-based difference between the
two statutes. Whereas the Delaware bill described previously in Sec-
tion 2 makes an age-based access distinction between video games
rated "M" and those rated "AO," the Minnesota bill does not distin-
guish between the two. In particular, the Delaware bill denies ac-
cess to games rated "M" to those under seventeen years of age while it
denies access to games rated "AO" to those under eighteen years of
age. What does this mean in terms of its practical effect? It means
204. See H.R. 221, 142d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2003). The bill provides
that the term "official rating" used in the proposed statute "means the rating of the
Entertainment Software Rating Board." Id.
205. Id. (requiring clear display of video game rating).
206. Id. ("A person who violates this section shall be guilty of a Class 'A'
misdemeanor.").
207. S. 35, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2003-04).
208. Id.
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that seventeen-year-old minors in Delaware have legal access to
games rated "M" but not to games rated "AO." Seventeen, then, is
the key swing or shift year in Delaware.
In contrast, there is no such distinction made in the Minnesota
legislation. Minnesota treats games rated "M" and "AO" as if they
were the same in terms of access restrictions. In particular, every-
one under the age of seventeen in Minnesota is denied access to
both "M" and "AO" games, and everyone age seventeen and older is
permitted access to those games. Thus, under the legislation pend-
ing in both states, a seventeen-year-old minor in Minnesota has a
legal right of access to games rated "AO" and "M" while another
similarly situated seventeen-year-old minor who happens to reside
in Delaware has access only to games rated "M." Seventeen-year-old
video game fans would much rather live in Minnesota than in Dela-
ware were the two bills to become law. The apparent arbitrariness
of the age cut-off points is discussed in Section C.
The Minnesota legislation is thus less precise and less well-
drafted than the Delaware legislation, yet it yields a greater right to
receive speech, for seventeen-year-olds. The Delaware legislation,
in contrast, recognizes and tracks the same age-based distinction
made by the Entertainment Software Rating Board ("ESRB") in de-
fining "M" and "AO" rated games, which use age seventeen as the
pivotal age at which games rated "M" "may be suitable" but for
which games rated "AG" are "not intended."20 9
A final word about the legislation pending in Minnesota is im-
portant to note. In particular, a related bill, Senate Bill No. 1140,
actually criminalizes minors who purchase these games.210 In par-
ticular, it provides that "[a] person under the age of 17 who know-
ingly rents or purchases a restricted video game is guilty of a petty
misdemeanor and is subject to a fine of not more than $25."211
Minnesota is thus unique among states as it targets both the supply
and demand sides of the video game equation by going after both
dealers and buyers. Senate Bill No. 1140 also requires stores that
sell video games to post a sign on the premises stating that "[i] t is
against the law for a person under 17 to rent or purchase a video
game rated AO or M. Violators may be subject to a $25 penalty."2 12
209. See supra notes 201-02 and accompanying text (defining "M" and "AG"
ratings categories).
210. SeeS. 1140, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2003-04) (penalizing minors with
misdemeanor).
211. Id.
212. Id.
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4. The Pennsylvania Legislation
Pennsylvania Senate Bill No. 822, introduced and referred to
the Judiciary Committee in June 2003, provides in relevant part that
"[a] person commits a summary offense if the person sells, rents or
otherwise provides for use for a charge any violent video or com-
puter game to a minor. '213 The bill defines a "violent video game"
as one "that contains realistic or photograph-like depictions of ag-
gressive conflict in which the player kills, injures or otherwise
causes physical harm to a human form" 214 and defines a "minor" as
"[a]ny person under 18 years of age."215 The bill also requires
stores to use the most recent ESRB evaluations for the games.2 16
The Pennsylvania bill differs significantly from each of the
other three bills previously discussed in terms of how it defines the
specific violent content to which minors are denied access. In con-
trast to the federal "Protect Children from Video Game Sex and
Violence Act of 2003," the Pennsylvania definition of "violent video
game" does not rely on the harmful-to-minors concept or terminol-
ogy such as that unsuccessfully employed by the City of Indianapolis
and St. Louis County.2 17 Unlike the legislation in both Delaware
and Minnesota, the Pennsylvania bill does not rely on the ratings of
"M" and "AO" voluntarily supplied and applied to games by the
ESRB.
Instead, Pennsylvania's definition of proscribed violent content
closely tracks, with one important exception, that of the now-en-
joined Washington legislation. The Washington bill defined a "vio-
lent video game" as one that "contains realistic or photographic-like
depictions of aggressive conflict in which the player kills, injures, or
otherwise causes physical harm to a human form in the game who is
depicted, by dress or other recognizable symbols, as a public law
enforcement officer."218 Likewise, the Pennsylvania bill uses the
language "contains realistic or photographic-like depictions of ag-
gressive conflict in which the player kills, injures or otherwise
causes physical harm to a human form."219 The critical difference
is at the tail end of the Washington bill's language, which more
narrowly tailors the class of human forms to only those who appear
213. S. 822, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003).
214. Id. (defining "violent video game").
215. Id. (defining "minor").
216. See id. (requiring "the most recent listings of the Entertainment Software
Rating Board for the inspection and review by any potential purchaser").
217. See supra notes 88-116 and accompanying text.
218. H.R. 1009, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003).
219. S. 822, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003).
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to be public law enforcement officers. The Pennsylvania bill makes
no distinction as to human form.
Why is this difference important? First, the Pennsylvania legis-
lature's failure to limit the restriction to physical harm done to law
enforcement officers might actually help to improve the potential
constitutionality of its measure. In particular, this limiting omission
eliminates the viewpoint-based problem that was present in the
Washington bill previously discussed in this article. 220 On the other
hand, the Pennsylvania's failure to limit the class of individuals
makes the bill less narrowly tailored and thus less likely to survive a
strict scrutiny challenge. 221
Another important difference between the Pennsylvania legis-
lation and that of both Delaware and Minnesota involves the spe-
cific age at which minors are denied access to video games. While
the Pennsylvania bill defines a minor as "[a]ny person under 18
years of age,"2 22 the Minnesota bill applies only "to a person under
17 years of age."22 3 This means that a seventeen-year-old video
game player would be subject to the access restrictions of the bill in
Pennsylvania but not subject to those in the Minnesota legislation.
Delaware splits the difference by allowing seventeen year olds access
to games rated "M" but not to those rated "AO." 224 The arbitrari-
ness of such age-based distinctions is explored in Section C.
With the terms of the federal, Delaware, Minnesota, and Penn-
sylvania legislation targeting access to video games in mind, this ar-
ticle now turns to the legislative history behind each of those bills.
B. The Legislative History
The legislative history described in this section was gleaned
from a number of sources, including the following: (1) statements
made in press releases and newspaper articles by the bills' sponsors;
(2) the text, in some cases, of the bills themselves, where legislative
findings were included; and (3) committee reports.
220. See supra notes 144-63 and accompanying next (describing arguments of
Video Software Dealers Association relating to viewpoint-based nature of Washing-
ton law).
221. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (describing strict scrutiny
standard of judicial review to which content-based laws are subject).
222. S. 822, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (defining minor) (em-
phasis added).
223. S. 35, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2003) (emphasis added) (noting af-
fected age group).
224. See H.R. 221, 142d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2003) (noting ratings of
ESRB).
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1. The Federal Legislation
The "Protect Children from Video Game Sex and Violence Act
of 2003" is actually the second effort by Representative Joe Baca to
regulate minors' access to violent video games. He proposed a simi-
lar measure in May 2002.225 That bill died in the House Subcom-
mittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security after gaining
thirty-five co-sponsors. 226
The 2003 measure, House Bill No. 669, proposed in February
of that year, gained more than forty co-sponsors and was sent to the
House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Secur-
ity in March 2003, where no further action was taken. 227 The Con-
gressional findings embodied in the bill, which constitute its formal
legislative history, specifically refer to social science evidence for
support. In particular, the bill provides that:
On July 26, 2000, six of the Nation's most respected public
health groups, including the American Medical Associa-
tion, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American
Academy of Family Physicians, and the American Academy
of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, found that viewing en-
tertainment violence can lead to increases in aggressive at-
titudes, behaviors, and values, particularly in children. 228
Here, it is important to note the broad generality of this appeal
to social science: "[v] iewing entertainment violence can lead to in-
creases in aggressive attitudes, behaviors, and values, particularly in
children."229 The findings do not refer specifically to video games,
but rather to entertainment violence generally. Furthermore, the
phrase "can lead" suggests that the result in question does not al-
ways happen; in some cases, it may not lead to increases in aggres-
sive attitudes, behaviors, and values. The bottom line is that the
exact same type of generalized use of social science research to sup-
225. See Protect Children from Video Game Sex and Violence Act of 2002,
H.R. 4645, 107th Cong. (2002) (noting bill introduced by Representative Joe
Bacca on May 2, 2002).
226. See Bill Summary & Status for the 107th Congress, at http://thomas.loc.
gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR04645:@@@X (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (show-
ing no further action taken in House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security).
227. See Bill Summary & Status for the 108th Congress, at http://thomas.loc.
gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d108:HR00669:@@@X (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (show-
ing no further action taken in House Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Security).
228. H.R. 669, 108th Cong. (2003) (noting congressional findings).
229. Id. (describing findings backing bill).
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port legislation was specifically rejected by two different federal ap-
pellate courts considering similar legislation - the Seventh Circuit
in American Amusement Machine Association230 and the Eighth Circuit
court of appeals in Interactive Digital Software Association.231 There-
fore, it is highly doubtful that the use of such general social science
evidence can prove the type of compelling government interest that
would be necessary for the federal legislation to pass constitutional
muster.
The congressional findings that accompany Representative
Baca's bill go beyond the mere recitation of social science evidence
that supposedly demonstrates harm. The findings also include facts
designed to demonstrate that minors have access to violent video
games that are not intended for their use and that cause them
harm. In particular, the bill provides in its Congressional findings
section that "[t]he ratings and content descriptors of video and
computer games issued by the entertainment industry reflect the
notion that certain video and computer games are suitable only for
adults due to graphic depictions of sex or violence" and that "a
study by the Federal Trade Commission showed that retailers al-
lowed 78 percent of unaccompanied minors, ages 13 to 16, to
purchase games rated as 'Mature' by the Entertainment Software
Rating Board."232
What is interesting is that the voluntary ratings system of the
Entertainment Software Ratings Board is now being turned against
the video game industry. Minors are able to purchase games that
the industry's own guidelines suggest are not suitable for them.
2. The Delaware Legislation
The official legislative history of this bill, which passed out of
the Judiciary Committee on June 18, 2003, is sparse. However,
some things are clear. First, the primary sponsor of the Delaware
legislation, Helene M. Keeley, is not a friend to the entertainment
industry. In addition to sponsoring legislation restricting minors'
access to violent video games, she also introduced another media-
related bill in 2003, which targets music. Specifically, House Bill
No. 220 provides, in relevant part:
230. For a discussion of American Amusement Machine Association, see supra
notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
231. For a discussion of the St. Louis County ordinance and the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision in Interactive Digital Software Ass'n, see supra notes. 46-132 and accom-
panying text.
232. H.R. 669, 108th Cong. (2003) (describing findings backing bill).
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No owner, operator or employee of a business shall sell,
rent or otherwise provide any recorded music or other re-
corded materials such as cassettes and compact discs that
has [sic] a parental advisory label identifying the music or
material as having explicit lyrics or explicit contents to any
person who is less than eighteen years of age.23 3
Another piece of legislative history on the Delaware video
game bill is revealed in the Judiciary Committee's official report on
the bill. The report provides that "[e]nforcement of violations of
this bill would be done in a self-monitoring manner; businesses
would be responsible for enforcing the standards set forth in the
bill. If a violation occurs, the customer would file a complaint with
the Attorney General's Office which would then investigate the
complaint. ' 234 This report suggests that the government will not
actively enforce this measure, indicating that its true intention is
merely to serve as legislative window dressing.
3. The Minnesota Legislation
Minnesota Senate Bill No. 35 has its roots in similar legislation
that was also proposed by Senator Sandy Pappas and that was de-
feated by the Minnesota Senate Commerce Committee in a 6-6 vote
in 2000.235 Senator Pappas blamed the prior defeat on what she
called "a tough committee - a conservative committee," 236 and
suggested the influence of video game lobbyists by noting that
"there are a lot of powerful lobbyists around this place." 237 Appar-
ently unfazed by this defeat, Senator Pappas introduced Senate Bill
No. 35 in 2003. This new effort was also defeated; this time, how-
ever, by a vote of "8-5 in the Senate Commerce and Utilities
Committee." 238
233. H.R. 220, 142d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2003) (describing prohib-
ited conduct).
234. House of Representatives, Committee Report, Del. House Bill 221, avail-
able at http://www.legis.state.de.us/Legislature.nsf/fsLIS?openframeset&Frame=
MAin&Src=/LIS/LIS142.NSF/Home?Openform (last visited Mar. 29, 2004)
(changing business with enforcing law).
235. See Happenings Thursday at the Minnesota Capitol, Assoc. PREss STATE &
LocL WiNE, Mar. 2, 2000 (describing bill and vote of Commerce Committee).
236. Id. (quoting Senator Sandy Pappas). Senator Allan Spear said "that the
bill amounted to 'censoring' and that it would treat the symptoms, not the cause,
of violent children." Id.
237. Id. (quoting Senator Sandy Pappas).
238. Happenings in the 2003 Legislative Session, Assoc. PREss STATE & LoCAL
WiRE, Mar. 6, 2003 (noting defeat of new measure in Senate).
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In contrast, Senate Bill No. 1140, which targets children who
purchase video games by subjecting them to petty misdemeanor
fines, passed by an overwhelming 53 to 8 vote in the Minnesota
Senate in May 2003.239 The measure had not gone further at the
time this article was written, as its companion measure, House Bill
No. 1492, remained in the House Judiciary Committee until ad-
journment. 240 When the Senate bill passed, Senator Pappas re-
vealed in her comments that the legislative intent of the bill actually
is not, despite its plain terms, to fine minors who purchase games
rated "M" and "AO." Senator Pappas told one reporter that she
"doubts that any children would actually be hit with fines if the bill
were enacted."241 Rather, Senator Pappas was more concerned that
the in-store signs warning of the possible fines would "really edu-
cate kids and parents." 24
2
4. The Pennsylvania Legislation
Pennsylvania Senate Bill No. 822 includes specific legislative
findings that make clear the interests that undergird the bill. In
particular, the bill provides that the legislature "recognizes that, as
confirmed by current scientific data, the repeated exposure to
graphic violence and participation in violent interactive games may
contribute to violent behavior by our youth and desensitizes them
to acts of violence."243 The governmental interests revealed here
are twofold.
The first interest relates to the phrase "violent behavior by our
youth" and can be thought of as a harms-to-others interest. In partic-
ular, the phrase "violent behavior by our youth" suggests that the
Pennsylvania legislature is concerned with preventing the harm to
all people - regardless of their age or whether they play video
games - who happen to come into contact with the Pennsylvania
children who play violent video games. Youthful players, as the bill
tells us, may engage in "violent behavior" against those people.
The second interest revealed in the legislative history relates to
the phrase "desensitizes them to acts of violence" and can be
239. Conrad deFiebre, Video-Game Rules Advance a Level, STAR TRIB. (Minneap-
olis), May 9, 2003, at 5B (noting passage of anti-access measure in Minnesota
Senate).
240. H.R. 1492, 83d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2003-04).
241. deFiebre, supra note 239, at 5B (commenting on probable non-enforce-
ment of law).
242. Id. (quoting Senator Sandy Pappas).
243. S. 822, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., at 6 (Pa. 2003) (noting desensiti-
zation of youth to violence).
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thought of as a harms-to-players interest. The injury the government
seeks to prevent here is to the video game players themselves.
Youthful players are, according to the bill, harmed and desensitized
to violence through the mere act of playing the games, regardless of
whether they ever commit acts of violence against others.
The Pennsylvania legislation also is notable because, like the
Congressional findings in the federal legislation, 244 its legislative
history appeals to social science evidence for support in demon-
strating that the twin government interests described above -
harm to others and harm to players - are indeed real and compel-
ling. To this extent, the phrase "confirmed by current scientific
data" is used in Pennsylvania Senate Bill No. 822. But as described
in Part I of this article, appeals to social science evidence to support
access-restriction legislation proved futile for the City of Indianapo-
lis, St. Louis County, and the state of Washington. 245
Finally, the Pennsylvania legislature drafted into the bill a legis-
lative finding that simply is not supported by any evidence, a find-
ing that would surely be rejected by any court. In an apparent
effort to demonstrate a link between crime in society and minors
who play video games, Senate Bill No. 822 provides that "l[t] he Gen-
eral Assembly recognizes that violent crime is a serious and persis-
tent problem in our society, especially among our youth."246 The
fact is that "violent crime and property crime are at a low not seen
since 1973."247 As the St. Louis Post-Dispatch opined in an editorial:
The Justice Department says that crime in America
dropped last year to the lowest level since the department
began surveying it 30 years ago. The crime rate has been
dropping steadily for a decade. The department said that
23 of every 1,000 Americans last year were victims of vio-
lent crime including rapes, robberies and assaults. That
compares to 50 of every 1,000 Americans in 1993. The
rate for property crimes, such as car theft and burglary,
244. For a discussion of the findings of the federal legislation, see supra notes
228-29 and accompanying text.
245. For a discussion of legislation or ordinances invalidated by various fed-
eral courts, see supra notes 37-178 and accompanying text.
246. S. 822, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess., 1 6 (Pa. 2003) (noting crime prob-
lem among youth).
247. Alexandra Marks, A Drop in Violent Crime That's Hard to Explain, CHRISTIAN
SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 25, 2003, at 1 (noting historical lows for violent crime). Vio-
lent crimes decreased 54% from 1993 to 2002. Id.
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was 159 for every 1,000 people last year, compared to 319
in 1993.248
The next section turns from the text and legislative history of
the bills to a substantive critique of their constitutional merits.
C. Analysis and Critique
This section identifies several legal flaws with the four bills de-
scribed in Sections A and B above.
1. Failure to Show Compelling Interest through Social Science
All of the bills described in Part II single out a specific subject
matter or type of content for regulation. The bills employ different
definitions to define that content. The federal legislation defines it
in terms of material that is "harmful to minors."249 The Delaware
and Minnesota bills borrow the ESRB's definitions of Mature and
Adult-Only content,250 while the Pennsylvania bill fashions its own
definition closely akin to that of the failed Washington state law.
251
Should any of these bills become law, each would be subject to the
strict scrutiny standard of judicial review against which the laws in
Indianapolis, St. Louis County, and Washington were measured.
This constitutional test contains a deliberately high hurdle, es-
sentially posing the following question: Is the government's interest
so critically important that it justifies a restriction on the fundamen-
tal right of free speech? Courts do not take that question lightly,
and, in the video game lawmaking context, meeting the compelling
interest requirement has proven to be a daunting task.
25 2
While there are differences in language and boundaries of pro-
tection among the federal and state measures described above, the
core of each of these legislative initiatives is designed to protect the
psychological well-being of minors who play violent video games
248. The Mean Streets of... Paris?, ST. Louis PosT-DISPATCH, Sept. 3, 2003, at
B6 (noting modem lows of crime levels in United States). In May 2004, the FBI
reported that violent crime in the U.S. dropped by 3.2 percent in 2003. Fox But-
terfield, Violent Crime Dropped by 3 percent in 2003, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2004, at A22.
249. For a discussion of the content covered by the federal legislation, see
supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text.
250. For a discussion of the content covered by the Delaware bill, see supra
notes 200-06, 209 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the content covered
by the Minnesota bill, see supra notes 207-08, 210-12 and accompanying text.
251. For a discussion of the content covered by the Pennsylvania bill, see
supra notes 213-17, 219, 222 and accompanying text.
252. For a discussion of legislation or ordinances restricting minors' access to
video games invalidated by various federal courts, see supra notes 37-178 and ac-
companying text.
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and, in at least one instance, to protect the physical safety of those
who come into contact with these youngsters. 253 As this article pre-
viously discussed in detail, 254 the government has often turned to
social science to show the harmful effects associated with playing
violent video games. For the most part, courts have remained
unimpressed, and, when challenged, these laws will ultimately suc-
ceed or fail based on how strongly the findings support the specific
harms underlying the statute. Relying on faulty correlations to pro-
vide the necessary link between the video game-playing behavior
and the resulting harm will not pass constitutional muster.255
Although the judicial experience in examining video game leg-
islation is a relatively limited, courts have honed in on the pur-
ported government interest with remarkable consistency. The
short history seen in the line of cases described throughout this
article makes it clear that when social science is used to support the
government's claim of a compelling interest in protecting children
from the alleged aggressiveness, courts will demand evidence that
directly and credibly supports the government's thesis.
Generic studies provide little help to courts. As previously dis-
cussed,256 Judge Posner found the studies presented in the Kendrick
case irrelevant, in large part because there was "no indication that
the games used in the studies [we] re similar to those in the record
of this case or to other games likely to be marketed in game arcades
in Indianapolis." 257 Likewise, the court in IDSA considered the tes-
timony of a psychologist, who purportedly found a link between
playing video games and aggressive behavior, a "vague generality"
that fell "far short of a showing that video games are psychologically
deleterious. '" 258 The court had even harsher words for the remain-
der of the social science evidence presented by St. Louis County,
253. For a discussion of the federal findings, see supra notes 43-44 and accom-
panying text. For a discussion of the Pennsylvania findings, see supra note 243 and
accompanying text.
254. For a discussion of the use of social science to justify access-limitation
legislation, see supra notes 43-44, 103-16 and accompanying text.
255. For a discussion of the failure of social science to provide protection to
access-limitation laws against constitutional attack, see supra notes 110-14 and ac-
companying text.
256. For a discussion of Kendrick, see supra notes 37-45 and accompanying
text.
257. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir.
2001) (repudiating social science research on violent video games).
258. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 959(8th Cir. 2003) (stating County had failed to present the "'substantial supporting
evidence' of harm that is required before an ordinance that threatens protected
speech can be upheld").
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labeling the additional studies "ambiguous, inconclusive, or irrele-
vant" largely because they were conducted on adults rather than on
minors. 259
In short, social science evidence that relies upon common
sense or intuitive hypotheses but does not prove a causal relation-
ship does little to advance the government's compelling interest ar-
gument, and courts appear willing to summarily dismiss it.
2. Failure to Provide for Parental/Guardian Consent Exceptions
Each of the four bills previously described is content-based and
thus would be subject to the strict scrutiny standard of judicial re-
view.260 Part of that standard, the part that focuses on the means
used to carry out the government's interest(s), requires the govern-
mental entity that is restricting speech to demonstrate that the stat-
ute in question is "the least restrictive means of advancing that
interest."261 As the Supreme Court has stated, "[i]f a less restrictive
alternative would serve the Government's purpose, the legislature
must use that alternative." 262
If, as Part III explains, the advocates of the current raft of legis-
lation simply want to help parents be better parents and not to re-
strict the First Amendment,263 then bills should be drafted to
include specific provisions allowing minors to purchase the re-
stricted video games if they have parental consent. Yet none of the
four bills described in Part II includes such an exception that would
give minors greater rights to receive speech that their parents deem
appropriate for their consumption.
The addition of such an exception would help to make the
bills more narrowly tailored; yet even such an exception is not a
guarantee of success. As the Kendrick case suggests, "conditioning a
minor's First Amendment rights on parental consent of this nature
259. Id. (requiring County to present "empirical support for its belief that
'violent' video games cause psychological harm to minors").
260. For a discussion of the standard of review applied to content-based dis-
crimination, see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
261. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 251 (3d Cir. 2003)
(overturning Child Online Protection Act provisions "not narrowly tailored to
achieve the Government's compelling interest in protecting minors from harmful
material").
262. United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(citing Reno v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997) and Sable
Communications of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (noting First Amend-
ment does not permit restricting speech "without an adequate justification")).
263. For a discussion of the pro-parent advocacy behind anti-access legisla-
tion, see infra notes 303-19 and accompanying text (Part III, Section A).
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is a curtailment of those rights. ' 2 6 4 Moreover, the federal courts
have recognized that while parents ultimately decide how they wish
to raise their children, the government may not "limit First Amend-
ment rights as a means of aiding parental authority,"265 nor can it
be said that "the government's role in helping parents to be the
guardians of their children's well-being is an unbridled license to
the government to regulate what minors read and view."
26 6
Despite the overwhelming constitutional odds against position-
ing parental consent as a condition, it may find some judicial sup-
port as a narrowing construction. Regardless, the provision should
be prescribed for any legislation premised upon the government
interest of assisting parents in doing their jobs.
3. Arbitrary Age Variations and the Failure to Narrowly Tailor
In August 2003, a federal judge in Kansas City, Missouri, issued
an injunction preventing the enforcement of a state law267 that
raised "the minimum age for nude dancers from 18 to 19."268 The
attorney for an adult entertainment club called Bazooka's had ar-
gued to the court that the "minimum-age law was arbitrary."269
United States District Judge Ortrie Smith "questioned why there
would be any greater secondary effects from 18-year-olds dancing
nude than from 19-year-olds." 270
While nude dancing and playing video games are obviously
quite different activities, the same arbitrariness of the minimum age
limit that plagued Missouri's dancing statute27 1 ultimately besets
264. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 578 (7th Cir.
2001) (calling parental consent-based rights illusory "to a considerable extent").
265. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 959
(8th Cir. 2003) (declining to recognize county's asserted compelling interest in
assisting "parents to be the guardians of their children's well-being").
266. Id. at 959-60 (interpreting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)).
267. Mo. REv. STAT. § 573.509 (2003) (making violation of statute Class "A"
misdemeanor).
268. Judge Blocks Enforcement of Law Barring 18-Year-Olds from Dancing Nude, As-
soc. PRESS STATE & LocAL WtRE, Aug. 28, 2003 (noting law "appears to be a viola-
tion of the First Amendment right to free expression").
269. Id. The attorney "acknowledged that the government could regulate
nude dancing but said the statute impinged too much on the right of free speech."
Id.
270. Id. (noting disparate treatment of non-minors). The judge prevented
enforcement of the statute, lest the dancers suffer irreparable harm. See id.
271. The law initially was buried deep in Missouri Senate Bill No. 298, which
was signed into law in July 2003 and provides in relevant parts that "no person less
than nineteen years of age shall dance in an adult cabaret.., nor shall any propri-
etor of such establishment permit any person less than nineteen years of age to
dance in an adult cabaret." S. 298, 92d Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2003);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 573.509 (2003). An "adult cabaret" is defined under Missouri law
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the video game legislation that has cropped up across the United
States. As clearly demonstrated in Section A, pending state legisla-
tion is anything but consistent when it comes to the specific age or
ages at which minors are allowed or denied access to violent video
games. 272 For instance, Pennsylvania would prohibit access for a
"person under 18 years of age,"273 while Minnesota would do so for a
"person under 17 years of age."2 7 4
The problem here is not just that different states set different
age standards. It is also that those standards themselves are arbi-
trary. Why not restrict access only for minors under 13 years of age?
Why not under 14 or under 15 or under 16? What is so magical,
from a legal perspective, about minors under the age of 17? Why
should they be subject to restriction? States never offer any expla-
nations in their respective legislative records for why they chose the
particular age barriers used. In addition, states fail to offer any
proof - social science or otherwise - that the age barriers they
have set are justified or make sense.
Data from the automobile industry, although completely unre-
lated to video games, may be useful. The data help to illustrate the
absurdity of the age limits set forth in the video game legislation.
Ironically, states will let teenagers drive at age sixteen, yet will not
let them, under pending legislation, play video games.275 Which
activity is more dangerous or potentially violent for sixteen-year-
olds, driving cars or playing video games? The facts are, according
to the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety, that "teenage drivers
represent a major hazard," with the risk of crash involvement "high-
est at age 16."276 The data also reveal that 821 sixteen-year-olds
died in passenger vehicles in 2001. More importantly, "among peo-
as "a nightclub, bar, restaurant, or similar establishment in which persons appear
in a state of nudity in the performance of their duties." Mo. REV. STAT. § 573.500
(2003).
272. For a discussion of the differences on the cutoff ages for access to re-
stricted video games, see supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
273. S. 822, 2003 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (emphasis added) (for-
bidding sale of restricted video games to people under eighteen).
274. S. 35, 83d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2003-04) (emphasis added) (forbid-
ding sale of restricted video games to people under seventeen).
275. For instance, in Pennsylvania, a sixteen-year-old boy or girl may be issued
a so-called 'junior driver's license." 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1503 (2003). Yet the
pending video game legislation in that same state restricts access to violent video
games for a "person under [eighteen] years of age." S. 822, 2003 Gen. Assem.,
Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003) (emphasis added). For a discussion of the differences in
cutoff ages between Pennsylvania and Minnesota, see supra notes 15, 19 and ac-
companying text.
276. Fatality Facts: Teenagers: 2002, Insurance Institute for Highway Safety &
Highway Loss Data Institute, at http://www.iihs.org/safetyjacts/fatality-facts/
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ple of all ages, 20 percent of passenger deaths in 2001 occurred
when a teenager was driving."277 Why is this important? Because
teenagers accounted for only "10 percent of the U.S. population in
2001 ."278
Given that a motor vehicle is far more dangerous in the hands
of a sixteen-year-old boy or girl than is a video game, and given that
sixteen-year-olds are permitted legal authorization to a motor vehi-
cle with a driver's license orjunior driver's license,2 79 it makes abso-
lutely no sense to restrict the access of minors who are sixteen to
video games that depict images of violence. If sixteen-year-olds can
drive cars, they should be allowed to play video games.
What about guns and minors' access to them? In Pennsylvania,
the same place where state Senator Jack Wagner has proposed the
anti-access video game legislation described above, 280 a child as
young as twelve years old can obtain a so-called junior hunting li-
cense. In particular, Pennsylvania law provides for the issuance of
junior hunting licenses:
to residents who have reached or will reach their 12th
birthday in the license year of application for a license but
who have not reached their 17th birthday prior to the date
of the application for the license and who present a writ-
ten request, bearing the signature of a parent or guardian,
for the issuance of a license. The actual hunting privileges
granted to the holder of a junior license shall not be exer-
cised until that person in fact is 12 years of age. 28 1
Moreover, under statutory law, the Pennsylvania Game Com-
mission actually has an affirmative legal duty to "initiate, implement
and administer two or more junior license hunter projects for the
purpose of increasing and sustaining interest in hunting among
young persons of this Commonwealth." 282 Therefore, a minor in
Pennsylvania can - in fact, is encouraged to - take a gun into the
woods and shoot animals. But, according to Senator Wagner, soci-
teens.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2004) (explaining "[c]rash rates are high largely
because of young drivers' immaturity combined with driving inexperience").
277. Id. (noting "[s]ixty-one percent of teenage passenger deaths in 2002 oc-
curred in crashes in which another teenager was driving").
278. Id. (observing teenagers in 2002 accounting for "14 percent of motor
vehicle deaths").
279. See supra note 275 (referring to concept in Pennsylvania ofjunior driver's
license).
280. See supra notes 16-21, 243-48 and accompanying text.
281. 34 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2705 (2003).
282. 34 PA. CONS. STAT. § 327 (2003).
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ety needs to protect that same minor from playing video games that
depict the fake shooting of cartoon and pixilated images of guns.
Further, a 17-year-old boy or girl in Pennsylvania is considered an
"adult" for hunting purposes,283 but that child would be a minor,
and thus unable to play a violent video games, under Wagner's
legislation.
Likewise, if the overwhelming majority of states (48, in fact)
allow sixteen-year-olds to get married,284 then surely sixteen-year-
olds should be allowed to play video games. It would be difficult to
justify a government official telling a sixteen-year-old boy, with a
straight face, "You're old enough to take on the responsibilities of
marriage, son, but I'm sorry to say that you're not old enough to
play a game with cartoon and pixilated images."
If anything, the age-barrier limits must be lowered substantially
if anti-access video game legislation is ever to have a chance of sur-
viving constitutional scrutiny. Age barriers must be much more
narrowly tailored, restricting access to speech only for those minors
who truly are harmed by it - and this will be up to the states to
prove, not free speech advocates.
4. Vagueness of Definitions Borrowed from the ESRB Ratings
A law will be declared unconstitutionally vague if "men of com-
mon intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as
to its application." 285 In contrast, a law will not be declared void if
"anyone of ordinary intelligence can grasp its import."286
While all four bills discussed in this article are easily susceptible
to challenges on the ground that their definitions of restricted vio-
lent content are defined too vaguely,287 the bills of both Delaware
283. See 34 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2705 (providing Pennsylvania may issue "[a]dult
resident hunting licenses to residents who have reached their 17th birthday but
have not reached their 65th birthday").
284. See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234, 247 (2002) (citing
U.S. National Survey of State Laws 384-88 (R. Leiter ed., 3d ed. 1999), noting "48
States permit 16-year-olds to marry with parental consent").
285. United States v. Washam, 312 F.3d 926, 929 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926)). The court goes on to
note that "laws [must] give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable oppor-
tunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may
trap the innocent by not providing fair warning." Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972)).
286. Weinberg v. City of Chicago, 310 F.3d 1029, 1042 (7th Cir. 2002), petition
for reh'g en banc denied, 320 F.3d 682 (7th Cir. 2003).
287. For instance, what do the terms "aggressive conflict" and "otherwise
causes physical harm" used in the Pennsylvania legislation described earlier really
mean? See supra notes 213-16. Aggressive conflict could be as mild as one charac-
ter pushing another character, while physical harm could be a bruise or paper cut.
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and Minnesota merit discussion here. Why? Because these bills do
not provide their own definitions of the restricted content, but
choose, instead, to rely on the definitions for "M" and "AO" rated
games as defined by a private entity, the ESRB. 288
The ESRB ratings require examination under the void for
vagueness doctrine. The "M" rating is currently defined as
"[c]ontent may be suitable for persons ages 17 and older. May con-
tain mature sexual themes or more intense violence or lan-
guage," 289 while the "AO" rating is defined as "[c]ontent suitable
only for adults. May include graphic depictions of sex and/or vio-
lence. Not intended for persons under the age of 18."290
On September 15, 2003, four new content descriptors29' devel-
oped by the ESRB took effect, and these help, to some extent, to
clarify the meaning of some of the words used in these defini-
tions.292 For instance, the "M" rating uses the term "intense vio-
lence." The ESRB now has a new descriptor for this term, defining
"intense violence" as "graphic and realistic-looking depictions of
physical conflict. May involve extreme and/or realistic blood, gore,
weapons, and depictions of human injury and death."29 3 The other
new descriptors distinguish intense violence from cartoon vio-
lence,29 4 fantasy violence 295 and sexual violence. 29 6 The "M" and
"AO" definitions mentioned above, however, "are unaffected" by
these changes and additions in the descriptors. 297 Also unchanged,
288. See supra notes 200-06 and 207-12 (describing terms of Delaware and
Minnesota bills).
289. ESRB Guide.
290. Id.
291. Content descriptors are "short, standardized phrases printed on the back
of game boxes that alert consumers to content elements that may be of interest or
concern." Matthew Kagan, Entertainment Software Rating Board Adds Four Content
Descriptors to Rating System and Unveils New Game Box Labels, June 26, 2003, at http://
www.esrb.org/newslinks.asp?id=l 5&ann=4.
292. Mike Snider, Ratings to be Clearer on Video-Game Boxes, USA TODAY, June
27, 2003, at 9E (discussing vagueness of ratings).
293. Kagan, supra note 291 (describing newly developed ESRB content
descriptors designed to provide parents and consumers more detail about games).
294. See id. The new ESRB descriptor for "cartoon violence" is defined as
"violent actions involving cartoon-like characters. May include violence where a
character is unharmed after the action has been inflicted." Id.
295. See id. The new ESRB descriptor for "fantasy violence" is defined as "vio-
lent actions of a fantasy nature, involving human or non-human characters in situa-
tions easily distinguishable from real life." Id.
296. See id. The new ESRB descriptor of "sexual violence" is defined as "de-
pictions of rape or other sexual acts." Id.
297. Id. (noting design of rating symbol would change).
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is the old descriptor for the root word "violence," which is defined
simply as "[s] cenes involving aggressive conflict. '298
The precision added by the new content descriptors clearly will
help decrease the chances of the ESRB-based definitions being de-
clared void for vagueness. The irony, of course, would be extreme
if the new descriptors made the bills in Delaware and Minnesota
immune from a vagueness challenge. The ESRB, in voluntarily im-
proving its own ratings system to help parents make better choices,
actually would have tied its own legal noose.
On the other hand, there is still some room for a vagueness
challenge of the pivotal root word, "violence" - "[s] cenes involving
aggressive conflict."299 The United States Supreme Court once pro-
claimed, "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."300 Clearly, the
same logic holds true today in defining words like "aggressive" and
"conflict"; one person's aggression is another person's zealousness.
The bottom line here is that the definitions of "M" and "AO" sup-
plied by the ESRB, while helpful for providing parental guidance,
may not provide sufficient legal guidance. Most likely, then, these
definitions would be declared unconstitutionally vague, and would
thereby render the Delaware and Minnesota legislation
unconstitutional.
As Parts I and II of this article have demonstrated, despite the
odds of anti-access video game legislation being declared unconsti-
tutional, the supply of future legislative efforts is not likely to dimin-
ish. Future legislative efforts are sustained by a number of
rhetorical strategies employed by its advocates. These important
strategies and techniques are analyzed in Part III of this article.
III. THE RHETORIC OF RESTRICTION: THEMES AND STRATEGIES OF
ANTI-ACCESS LEGISLATION PROPONENTS
Why do the proponents of legislation limiting minors' access to
violent video games continue to draft bills, despite the transparent
fact that such bills most likely will be declared unconstitutional?
One obvious answer is that it is a politically popular position to at-
tack the media - media bashing and the media blame-game are
nothing new30 ' - and, concomitantly, to advocate the reduction of
298. ESRB Guide.
299. Id. (listing content descriptors).
300. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (referring to slogan on de-
fendant's jacket).
301. As Professor Bob Thompson of Syracuse University says about today's
attacks on violent media content:
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violence in society. 30 2 No politician, after all, is going to come out
and declare, 'Yes, I support violence in video games. I support a
culture of violence." Taking such a position surely would be politi-
cal suicide.
This part of the article, which analyzes a number of sources -
ranging from newspaper articles to press releases to the text of testi-
mony before legislative bodies - identifies five major themes and
strategies commonly employed by the advocates of such legislation
to win popular - and perhaps, judicial - support for their bills.
These measures arguably amount to the sophistry - plausible yet
fallacious logic that is used to deceive and obfuscate - that is ex-
posed below through critique and criticism. At worst, the argu-
ments of the pro-legislation lobby are at the height of dissembling.
A. We're Not Anti-First Amendment; We're Pro-Parent
One of the most important and popular strategies of legislators
who want to curtail minors' access to violent video games is to sug-
gest that the legislation is decidedly pro-parent, and that it is all
about helping parents be better parents, not about infringing on
anyone's First Amendment rights. Disseminating this position to
the public in newspapers supposedly wins public - read, parental
- support and re-election.3 0 3
This is the same old story going back to any form of popular media in
history. It goes all the way back to when people thought Coney Island was
going to put kids on the road to perdition. It is the comic-books scare in
the 1950s, which almost destroyed the industry. Whatever is the culture
of choice tends to upset parents no end.
Id. C. W. Nevius, Parents Fear Perils of Media, Poll Shows; New S.F. Group Puts Ratings
Guide Online, S.F. CHRON., May 22, 2003, at Al.
302. It is more than a little ironic, of course, that this wave of video game
legislation, which is based on fears of violence, is occurring despite the fact that
"violent crime and property crime fell last year to their lowest levels since the gov-
ernment began collecting statistics 30 years ago." Richard Willing, Crime Rate Hits
30-Year Low, USA TODAY, Aug. 25, 2003, at IA. Enhancing the irony is the fact that
juvenile crime itself is also down in states across the country. See, e.g., Ian Ith,
Arrests Show Juvenile Crime at 20-Year Low, SEATrLE TIMES, Sept. 17, 2002, at BI (re-
porting decrease juvenile crime rate in State of Washington - first state to enact
video game access legislation); Babita Persaud, Bush Budget Worries Youth Agencies,
ST. PETERSBUtRG TIMES (Fla.), Feb. 26, 2003, at 4B (describing "lower juvenile crime
rate" in Florida); Craig Whitlock, Ehrlich Offers Reforms in Juvenile Justice; Republican
Promises More Money and Criticizes Md. Agency, Townsend's Record, WASH. POST, Oct.
10, 2002, at B05 (reporting 'Juvenile crime rates have declined" in Maryland).
303. Interestingly, support of such video game legislation does not always lead
to re-election. Consider the case of Jeff Wagener, the St. Louis County Council
member who in October 2000 proposed the anti-access video game legislation de-
scribed earlier in this article. He was defeated less than three months after propos-
ing that measure when he ran for another term. See Phil Sutin, Council May Shift its
Meetings to Nighttime; GOP now controls of St. Louis County body, ST. Louis PosT-Dis-
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Consider, for instance, the recent comments of Representative
Joe Baca, the primary sponsor of the "Protect Children from Video
Game Sex and Violence Act of 2003":304
We, as parents, have to take responsibility for our chil-
dren. But stores also have a responsibility. When kids can
walk into their neighborhood stores and buy games with
graphic[ally] violent and sexual content, parents are cut
out of the decision-making process. If local, state or fed-
eral governments have to help put parents back into the
equation, then so be it.305
Baca uses the word "parents" three times in a matter of only
four short sentences. Furthermore, he forgets to mention that part
of "the equation," as he calls it, which involves the First Amendment
rights of those parents' children, also involves the rights of the cre-
ators of video games. 30 6
Baca, of course, is not the only proponent of access-limitation
legislation to play the pro-parent card in sponsoring legislation. St.
Louis County Councilman Jeff Wagener followed the same path
when proposing a law that ultimately was declared unconstitutional
by the Eighth Circuit.30 7 As he told members of the Council's Jus-
tice Health and Welfare Committee, his goal is "not to ban video or
arcade games, but to give parents control. °30 8
When advocates of legislation raise the First Amendment, they
never say that the First Amendment is not an important part of life
in the United States.30 9 They are too clever to fall into that trap.
Instead, advocates of such legislation suggest that the First Amend-
ment simply is not relevant, because it just does not apply to video
games in the first place. For instance, Representative Mary Lou
Dickerson, author of the Washington law that was enjoined by a
PATCH, Nov. 9, 2000, at CI (describing how Republican John Campisi defeated
Wagener).
304. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
305. Karen MacPherson, Bill Would Shield Kids From Graphic E-Games, PiTr.
POsT-GAZETTE, June 23, 2003, at A-1.
306. Id.
307. See supra notes 46-132 and accompanying text.
308. Sutin, supra note 50, at D4.
309. Indeed, Mary Lou Dickerson, the sponsor of the statewide legislation in
Washington, even referred to it reverentially as "our precious First Amendment."
Queary, supra note 26 (reporting comments when law enacted). Jeff Wagener, the
sponsor and author of the St. Louis County legislation, told a reporter that "I know
the First Amendment is very powerful, and we shouldn't place restrictions on it
lightly." Donna Walter, Video Game Ordinance Considered Unconstitutional, ST. Louis
DAiLY REcoRD, June 5, 2003.
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federal court in July 2003,310 told broadcast journalist Gwen Ifill
during The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer that "I don't believe that when
we're talking about ultra-violent video games where players get
points for decapitating people or beating people to death, I don't
believe that's covered by the First Amendment."3 11 Likewise,
Michelle Bachmann, a Minnesota state senator and supporter of
anti-access legislation in that state, told her fellow senators in May
2003, "We're talking hard core, triple-x material. You want to tell
me that people in this body would call this free speech?"3 12
The pro-parent, pro-legislation position is, of course, easy to
take. After all, no politician wants to be dubbed "anti-parent." Yet,
the irony is that parents who are concerned about their children's
well-being do not need the government to step in and act on their
behalf, or to tell them what their kids may not purchase without
their permission. As a parent from St. Louis County told the Coun-
cil during a public-forum segment on its anti-access legislation, "it's
not up to the government to say whether or not I'm a bad
parent. "313
Parents already have ratings for video games supplied by the
ESRB, which are available to them without the need for govern-
ment legislation. All they need to do is visit the ESRB website at
http://www.esrb.org/ to find ratings for games like Doom3 14 or
Grand Theft Auto: Vice City, a top seller and favorite whipping boy3 15
310. See supra notes 138-78 and accompanying text.
311. The NewsHour with fim Lehrer: Violent Video Games (PBS television broad-
cast, July 7, 2003), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/entertainment/
july-dec03/video_07-07.html [hereinafter NetwsHour].
312. Patrick Howe, Senate Hopes to Press 'Reset' on Violent Game Sales to Children,
Assoc. PRESS STATE & LocAL WIRE, May 8, 2003 (describing debate surrounding
Minnesota vote, which made it illegal for children under seventeen to rent or buy
violent video games).
313. Sutin, supra note 48, at Cl (quoting Chris Leukert, parent from south St.
Louis County).
314. See ESRB Ratings, at http://www.esrb.org/search-results.asp?key=
doom&x=44&y=8&type=game (last visited June 2, 2004).
315. For instance, in his March 2003 newsletter to constituents, Washington
state Representative, Jerome Delvin, wrote that House Bill 1009, which later would
become law and only to be enjoined by a federal court as described in Part I,
Section B of this article, "is intended to make it harder for kids to get their hands
on games such as 'Grand Theft Auto: Vice City' (which lets players kill police of-
ficers, steal cars, vandalize stores, deal drugs, rape prostitutes and so on)." Make
Violent Video Games Harder to Get, A REPORT FROM THE 2003 LEGISLATIVE SESSION
(Rep. Jerome Delvin, 8th Legislative District), Mar. 2003, at 3 (on file with au-
thors). A copy of this newsletter can be found online at the website of Representa-
tive Jerome Delvin. See http://www.leg.wa.gov/house/members/newslttr/
delvin03_l.pdf (last visited June 2, 2004).
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of the anti-access legislation proponents.3 16 Grand Theft Auto: Vice
City is rated "M" because of, as the ESRB website tells parents,
"Blood and Gore, Strong Language, Strong Sexual Content, [and]
Violence. '317 A number of other websites run by non-governmental
agencies also exist to help parents make wise choices about their
children's media consumption. 318
This type of information is sufficient to place the government
out of the video game equation and to leave parents in charge. As
Stephanie Greist, communications director for the Free Expression
Policy Project, told a reporter for The New York Times in June 2003,
"[p]arents are the best judges of their children and what they can
handle."3 19
B. Kids Are Naive and Weak; They Need Our Help and
Eminent Wisdom
If you listen to the advocates of anti-access video game legisla-
tion, you would believe that children in the United States are in-
credibly weak, susceptible to any media influence, and engage in
whatever behavior they see in a video game. Consider the
following:
" United States Rep. Joe Baca believes that "kids are being
brainwashed" by video games.320
" Sandy Pappas, a state senator from Minnesota who is
sponsoring legislation in that state, believes that violent
video games are "very detrimental to the psychological
well-being of our youth."3 21
316. SeeMacPherson, supra note 305, atAl ("U.S. Rep[resentative] Joe Baca is
no fan of 'Grand Theft Auto: Vice City,' the best-selling video game in America last
year").
317. See ESRB Game Ratings, at http://www.esrb.org/search-results.asp?key=
grand+Theft+Auto+Vice+City&x=33&y=2&type=game (last visited June 2, 2004)
(rating Grand Theft Auto: Vice City).
318. See, e.g., Common Sense Media, at http://www.commonsensemedia.org
(last visited June 2, 2004) (featuring video game rating media guide).
319. Katie Hafner, On Video Games, The Jury Is Out And Confused, N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 2003, at G7 (exploring allegations of video games inducing violent
behavior).
320. Press Release, Baca to Federal Trade Commission: "What are you doing
to protect our kids? ", Apr. 10, 2003 (applauding Congressman Baca's questioning
of Federal Trade Commission efforts to curtail violent video game sales to minors),
at http://www.house.gov/baca/108th/pr030410.htm [hereinafter Baca FTC].
321. Howe, supra note 312.
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* Video game makers, in the words of Jeff Wagener, the
sponsor of the St. Louis County ordinance, "prey on
children."3 22
The use of words like "brainwashed" and "prey" is tantamount
to what the United States Supreme Court calls "rhetorical hyper-
bole."323 These are words used in a "loose, figurative sense" that
constitute nothing more than "lusty and imaginative expression. '"3 24
While the video game industry exists to make a profit, like
thousands of other business that sell products, it is not preying on
children. In fact, the industry sponsors the ratings for video games
that parents and children may use to decide what is or is not suita-
ble content. The ERSB states on its website that it:
is a self-regulatory body... established in 1994 by the En-
tertainment Software Association (ESA), formerly the In-
teractive Digital Software Association (IDSA). ESRB
independently applies and enforces ratings, advertising
guidelines, and online privacy principles adopted by ...
the industry. To date, the ESRB has rated more than
9,000 titles submitted by 350 publishers.3 25
Concerned parents are free to use the ESRB's Web site as pre-
viously noted in Section A.326 The ESRB notes on its home page
that its rating system "helps parents and other consumers choose
the games that are right for their families."327 The video game
Grand Theft Auto: Vice City, which legislators so often complain
about, is rated "M" for Mature, meaning that it is suitable only for
people seventeen years of age and older.3 2 8 This clearly is not a
case of the video game industry preying on children. It is, in con-
trast, a case of the video game industry voluntarily coming forward
and telling parents that the game is not intended for minors.
322. Jeff Wagener, Letters to the Editor: Enforce Video Game Ordinance, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, June 22, 2002, at 36 (supporting violent video game ordinance).
323. Milkovich v. LorainJ. Co., 497 U.S. 1, 17 (1990) (quoting Greenbelt Co-
operative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14 (1970)).
324. Id. (quoting Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 286 (1974)).
325. About ERSB, at http://www.esrb.org/about.asp (last visited June 2,
2004) (explaining purpose of ESRB).
326. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
327. ESRB website, at http://www.esrb.org (last visited June 2, 2004) (listing
content and purpose on homepage).
328. See ESRB Guide(defining game ratings).
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What might be called the hyperbole-of-harm strategy described
in this section is closely linked to another strategic device of legisla-
tive advocates. That other tool is described below in Section C.
C. The Games Allow Children to Kill People, Even Though
They Aren't Really People . .. And Even Though They
Aren't Really Killing
"Some games even allow children to watch naked strippers and
watch acts of sodomy and oppression," said Representative Joe Baca
in an April 2003 press release, calling for curtailment of the sale
and rental to minors of sexual and violent video games.
3 29 Of
course, his statement is not really correct at all. Video games do not
actually allow kids to watch naked strippers in person or to see real
acts of sodomy or violence. Instead, they allow kids to look at and
to interact with either technologically generated fictitious images
- cartoon or pixilated - or video images placed on a computer
game. Moreover, these games are specifically rated as intended for
mature audiences only, such as the game BMX XXX, which carries
the "M" rating,330 in part, because it does feature topless nudity in
some versions.331
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary defines the word "anthro-
pomorphic" to mean, "ascribing human characteristics to nonhu-
man things. ' 332  This process was precisely illustrated when
Representative Mary Lou Dickerson, author of the now-enjoined
Washington state law, said, as she did on The NewsHour with Jim
Lehrer in July 2003, that the games allow kids to engage in
"[d]ifferent variations on beating women to death. Players get
points for having sex with a prostitute. Now they're getting out of
329. Baca FTC, supra note 320, at http://www.house.gov/baca/108th/
pr030410.htm.
330. See ESRB Game Rating, at http://www.esrb.org/search-results.asp?key=
BMX+XXX&x=25&y-13&type=game (last visited June 2, 2004) (rating BMX XXX
as "M"). The "M" rating, as established by the ESRB, means that the content "may
be suitable for persons ages 17 and older. May contain mature sexual themes or
more intense violence or language." ESRB Guide (listing video game ratings).
331. See Press Release: AKA ACCLAIM RELEASES 'BMX XXX' FOR
NINTENDO GAMECUBE, at http://www.acclaim.com/company/pressReleases/
product/BMXXXXGameCubeShips.html (last visited June 2, 2004) (describing
BMX XXX as being "designed specifically for today's predominantly mature gam-
ing audience"). "The version for the PlayStation2 computer entertainment system
has been edited to eliminate the topless nudity, while versions for Xbox and
Nintendo GameCube do contain topless nudity." Id.
332. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 93 (11th ed. 2003).
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the car, he's going to take his money back, and then beat the prosti-
tute to death." 333
There are, of course, no real prostitutes. No one actually beats
women to death. Children do not get to beat up prostitutes. In-
stead, they engage in a fictitious role-playing activity. Dickerson is
naive to think that most kids cannot tell fact from fiction. Of the
many thousands of kids (and adults) who have played the game
Grand Theft Auto: Vice City, the video game Dickerson implicitly re-
ferred to in her comments, 33 4 how many have actually beaten up a
real prostitute or killed a police officer or any other person for that
matter?335 Dickerson wisely avoids this issue.
Seventeen-year-old Michael Capece, who has been playing
video games his whole life, perhaps put it best when he said to a
reporter from the Buffalo News that 'just because you see something
in a game doesn't mean you're going to go out and do it. I'm not
going to act them out."336 As sixteen-year-old Cory Clontz, who has
played video games since he was six and spends a couple of hours
each night playing them, told the same reporter, Grand Theft Auto:
Vice City is "hot because people lust for violence in games. They
333. NewsHour, supra note 311 (reporting debate surrounding video game
laws).
334. In Grand Theft Auto: Vice City, "a player can have sex with a prostitute and
then beat her to death with a crowbar." Hannah Bergman, County Still Will Push To
Curb Violent Video Games, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, June 24, 2003, at BI (outlining
legal battle between St. Louis County officials and gaming industry with respect to
marketing violent video games to children).
335. Out of the hundreds of thousands of people who have played Grand Theft
Auto: Vice City, the authors of this article could find only two reported cases in
which it is alleged that playing a version of the game influenced children to com-
mit murder. In a civil lawsuit now pending in Ohio, it is alleged that the killing of
a 17-year-old girl was inspired by an earlier version of this video game, called Grand
Theft Auto III. See Stephen Hudak, Lauyer's Motive in Teen Murder Trial Debated,
PLAIN DEALER (CLEVELAND), June 7, 2003, at B3 (detailing murder of JoLynn
Mishne). The defendant in the related criminal case, Dustin Lynch, pleaded guilty
in December 2003 to one count of aggrevated murder by prior calculation and
design, with prosecutors apparently ignoring the role of the video game. Rena A.
Koontz, Teen Gets Life for Killing Medina Girl, PLAIN DEALER (CLEVELAND), Dec. 23,
2003, at BI. In another case, a Michigan man was killed by minors who were alleg-
edly inspired by playing Grand Theft Auto III. See Paul M. Weyrich, Most Dangerous
Games: Video Games That Inspire Serious Crimes, FREE CONGRESS FOUNDATION: NOTA-
BLE NEWS Now, Feb. 5, 2003 (praising efforts of Representative Joe Baca and attor-
ney Jack Thompson for pursuing legislation regulating purchase of violent video
games), available at http://www.freecongress.org/commentaries/2003/030205PW.
asp.
336. Anthony Violanti, You Call This Fun?; That's What Parents May be Wonder-
ing as a New Generation of Gaming Glorifies Life-Like Brutality, Vice and Violence, BUF-
FALO NEWS (N.Y.), Jan. 26, 2003, at El.
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can't do violence in real life, so they do it in games. That way, they
don't get in trouble."33
7
Finally, the fact that the violent images in question are not real
is an important point that merits attention. In Ashcrofi v. Free Speech
Coalition,33 8 the United States Supreme Court protected computer-
generated and other fictitious images that were so life-like that they
appeared to be of real children engaged in sexually explicit con-
duct. In so holding, Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote for the Court
that the federal statute at issue, the Child Pornography Prevention
Act of 1996, "proscribes the visual depiction of an idea - that of
teenagers engaging in sexual activity - that is a fact of modern
society and has been a theme in art and literature throughout the
ages. '339
Similar reasoning, of course, applies to regulating video games
that contain fictitious images. Violence, like teens engaged in sex-
ual activity, is indeed a fact of modern society and has, as Judge
Posner observed in Kendrick, been a theme in art and literature
throughout the ages.340
Moreover, the Court in Free Speech Coalition also stressed the
extremely speculative nature of the harm allegedly caused by the
fictitious images, stating that "[t]he harm does not necessarily fol-
low from the speech, but depends upon some unquantified poten-
tial for subsequent criminal acts."341 The same logic applies with
the violent imagery in video games. The harm in this case - kids
acting out with violent and aggressive behavior against others -
does not necessarily flow from the speech. Such a harm similarly
depends on some unquantified potential for subsequent criminal
acts. If the connection between the speech and the harm in Free
Speech Coalition is, as Justice Kennedy described it, "a remote con-
nection,"3 42 surely the connection between those who play a video
game depicting the killing of prostitutes and those who actually
then go out and kill prostitutes is equally as remote, if not more so.
337. Id. (describing appeal of violent video games to sixteen-year-old Cory
Clontz).
338. 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
339. Id. at 246 (reflecting on literary, artistic, political, and scientific value of
speech prohibited by Child Pornography Prevention Act).
340. Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 575 (7th Cir.
2001) (noting games depicting violent images have not incited youths to commit
violent acts).
341. Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. at 250 (finding only contingent, indirect
causal link between virtual child pornography and actual child abuse).
342. Id. at 253 (describing link between "speech that might encourage
thoughts or impulses and any resulting child abuse").
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D. The Best Evidence is Anecdotal... or Maybe It's
Social Scientific
When legislation is proposed that restricts minors' access to
video games, one can rest assured that one word - Columbine 43
- undoubtedly will appear somewhere in close proximity to the
supporting rhetoric, along with, more recently, another name -
Malvo. That is because advocates of legislation love to use anecdo-
tal evidence - such as the shootings by Eric Harris and Dylan
Klebold at Colubmine High School near Littleton, Colorado, in
April 1999, and the sniper shootings near Washington, D.C., in fall
2002 allegedly committed by Lee Boyd Malvo5 44 - about real-life
violence that supposedly was caused by fictitious video-game
violence.
Consider the testimony of Jack Thompson, a Florida attorney
and outspoken critic of video games,34 5 before the state of Washing-
ton's Senate Children & Family Services & Corrections Committee.
His testimony was in support of the law that was struck down by
Judge Lasnik:
[W]e learned within three days of Columbine that for
months Klebold and Harris trained for murder by playing
Doom. They used a software patch by Ids software of Dal-
las[,] Texas - the creators of Doom - that let them
morph the yearbook faces of their classmates from their
Columbine year book onto the bodies of the virtual
humans they practiced killing. They were sold other
software patches - by the same company coming out with
Doom 3 which will eclipse the mayhem of that game - to
alter the hallways of the virtual killing field in which they
stalked their prey and the colors and twists and turns of
the hallways as they stalked their prey. They were pro-
343. See generally Tom Kenworthy, Up to 25 Die in Colorado School Shooting,
WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1999, at Al (describing killings at Columbine High School as
"a shooting rampage on a scale unprecedented in an American school").
344. Malvo and a companion were "accused in all [ten] fatal sniper shootings
in the Washington area" in fall 2002. Tom Jackman, Disclosures May Help Malvo's
Defense, WASH. POST, July 24, 2003, at Bi. It has been reported that Malvo played
the video game Halo and that his alleged accomplice, John Allen Muhammad,
"'would coach Malvo on how to shoot in the sniper mode"' of Halo and that Malvo
"'was really into the game and would often get angry while playing it.'" Id. at B7
(quoting Commonwealth Attorney Robert F. Horon, Jr.). Malvo was convicted of
capital murder in December 2003. See Andrea F. Siegel, Jury Convicts Malvo in
Sniper Shootings, BALT. SUN, Dec. 19, 2003, at IA.
345. See Hudak, supra note 335, at B3 (describing Thompson as "a lawyer
known for crusading against violence in video games").
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vided by a leader in the industry with a virtual killing field
in which they trained to kill their eventual victims. And
they were so enamored of Doom that Time Magazine said in
their videotape suicide note they named a shotgun after
one of the characters in Doom. 3
46
Just a few paragraphs later, the inevitable, almost obligatory,
reference to Malvo appeared in Thompson's prepared testimony:
On October 10 of last year, I appeared live on NBC's To-
day show and I told Matt Lauer, with the Beltway Snipers
still unknown and at large, that the shooter would "likely
be a teenaged boy who trained on a video game switched
to sniper mode." Two weeks later Muhammad and Malvo
were caught. Two months after that Dateline NBC on De-
cember 14 reported: "Muhammad, satisfied with Malvo's
ability to snipe at a distance developed on the rifle range,
still found Malvo unwilling to kill, so he, Muhammad, had
Malvo play a shooter video game, switched to sniper
mode, which broke down the teens [sic] inhibition to
kill."13 47
Thompson's testimony is littered with other specific anecdotes,
in which video games allegedly were, in Thompson's own words, "a
final link in a twisted chain of events pushing a kid at risk over the
edge." 348 Thompson is not the only legislative advocate who refer-
ences Columbine or Malvo. For instance, Representative Dicker-
son, in her appearance on The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer in July 2003,
stated:
We've been seeing a whole rash of shootings throughout
this country and in Europe that relate back to kids who
obsessively play violent video games. The kids involved as
shooters in Columbine were obsessively playing violent
video games. We know after the beltway sniper incident
where the 17-year-old was a fairly good shot, but Mr. Mo-
hammed, the police tell us, got him to practice on an ul-
346. Jack Thompson, Testimony on House Bill 1003 before the Senate Chil-
dren & Family Services & Corrections Committee (Apr. 2, 2003) (providing
Thompson's testimony on proposed law banning sales of violent video games to
children under seventeen), available at http://hdc.leg.wa.gov/members/dicker-
son/thompsontestimony.asp.
347. Id.
348. Id.
61
Calvert: The 2003 Legislative Assault on Violent Video Games: Judicial Rea
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2004
264 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JouRNAL
tra-violent video game in sniper mode to break down his
hesitancy to kill. 349
Jeff Wagener, the sponsor of the now-enjoined St. Louis
County ordinance, also referenced Columbine and other school
shootings at a news conference when he first introduced the mea-
sure. He stated that "[e]xposure to such violence has been linked
to anti-social and violent behavior, such as the school shootings in
Columbine, Jonesboro and Paducah."350 In a newspaper opinion
column lamenting the appellate court's decision, Wagener reiter-
ated this use of anecdotal evidence, writing that "[t] he perpetrators
of the school shootings in Littleton, Colo., Jonesboro, Ark., and
Paducah, Ky., wewre avid fans of these games and used them to
perfect their shooting technique." 351
Appeals to anecdotal evidence, in large part, are flawed be-
cause such high-profile events like Columbine are incredibly rare.
As James Forman, Jr., a fellow at the New America Foundation,3 52
observed in a guest editorial in The Washington Post, "a child now
has less than a one-in-two-million chance of being killed in school.
Today a student is more likely to be killed by lightening than in a
school homicide."3 5 3 Thus, while anecdotal evidence is not com-
pletely valueless,3 54 and certainly has vast visceral appeal, it must be
remembered that such rare incidents, which involve a multitude of
contributory factors other than violent video games, should not be
used to support broad-based legislation.
Because the anti-access legislation advocates apparently realize
that they cannot rest their case on anecdotes alone, they also appeal
349. NewsHour, supra note 311 (reporting debate surrounding laws regulating
sale of violent video games).
350. Sutin, supra note 48, at C3 (outlining Wagener's motives for proposing
legislation).
351. Wagener, supra note 125, at B7 (citing studies by American Medical Asso-
ciation suggesting children exposed to violent video games imitate such behavior).
352. The New America Foundation describes itself as:
an independent, non-partisan, non-profit public policy institute that was
conceived through the collaborative work of a diverse and intergenera-
tional group of public intellectuals, civic leaders, and business executives.
New America's Board of Directors is chaired by James Fallows, and Ted
Halstead is the organization's founding President and CEO. Based in our
nation's capital, the Foundation opened its doors in January 1999.
New America Foundation Mission, at http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=
overview (last visited June 2, 2004) (stating mission and description of New
America Foundation).
353. James Forman, Jr., Overkill on Schools, WASH. PosT, Apr. 23, 2001, at A15
(arguing against adoption of zero tolerance policies at schools).
354. See SINGLETARY, supra note 113, at 43 (describing anecdotal evidence as
"prescience" does not include "the rigor of science").
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to social science research on media effects. The classic question
asked in the media effects tradition of communication science, 355
as originally posed by Harold Lasswell fifty years ago, is "Who Says
What In Which Channel To Whom With What Effect? '3 56 In the
case of violent video games, the relevant issue is: "What are the ef-
fects of playing these games on children?" Legislative advocates
would like to have the public and courts believe that these games
cause children to become violent predators.
Although the courts in Kendrick, IDSA, and Maleng have each
rejected social science evidence for failing to support the video
game laws at issue in those cases, appeals to science are still com-
monplace among legislative proponents. In fact, social science re-
search is now finding its way directly into the legislative record. For
instance, Representative Joe Baca's federal bill for the "Protect Chil-
dren from Video Game Sex and Violence Act of 2003" provides, in
relevant part:
On July 26, 2000, six of the Nation's most respected public
health groups, including the American Medical Associa-
tion, the American Academy of Pediatrics, the American
Academy of Family Physicians, and the American Academy
of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry, found that viewing en-
tertainment violence can lead to increases in aggressive at-
titudes, behaviors, and values, particularly in children. 357
St. Louis County Councilman Jeff Wagener also appeals to the
use of social science to argue that the legislation he sponsored is
necessary. As he wrote in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, "[s]tudies by
the American Medical Association suggest that exposure to violent
video games cause children to imitate the violent behavior, glorify
violent heroes, become desensitized to violence and learn that vio-
lence is rewarded. '3 58 Thus, the official preamble to the St. Louis
County ordinance included, not surprisingly, similar language:
355. Communication scholars, Charles Berger and the late Steven Chaffee
wrote, "communication science seeks to understand the production, processing,
and effects of symbol and signal systems by developing testable theories, contain-
ing lawful generalizations, that explain phenomena associated with production,
processing, and effects." CHARLES R. BERGER & STEVEN H. CHAFFEE, HANDBOOK OF
COMMUNICATION SCIENCE 17 (1987).
356. Harold D. Lasswell, The Structure and Function of Communication in Society,
in READER IN PUBLIC OPINION AND COMMUNICATION 178 (2d ed. 1966) (suggesting
answer to question is "a convenient way to describe an act of communication").
357. H.R. 669, 108th Cong. (2003).
358. Wagener, supra note 125, at B7 (justifying use of social science).
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WHEREAS, numerous medical studies have cited a link
between prolonged playing of violent video games and vio-
lent, antisocial and otherwise harmful behavioral patterns,
and the American Medical Association suggests that expo-
sure to violence, such as in these video games, causes chil-
dren to imitate violent behavior, glorify violent heroes,
become desensitized to violence and learn that violence is
rewarded.35
9
In the state of Washington, the official record of House Bill
1009 provides, in pertinent part, that "there has been an increase in
studies showing a correlation between exposure to violent video and
computer games and various forms of hostile and antisocial behav-
ior."360 The key weakness in this statement is the word "correla-
tion," which fails to carry the same meaning or match the
importance of the word causation. 361
Likewise, the vague terms "hostile" and "antisocial behavior"
can be interpreted so broadly as to mean "being impolite or mean."
There is a major difference between research showing a correlation
between playing violent video games and being impolite and re-
search showing a direct cause-and-effect relationship between play-
ing violent video games and killing real-life police officers or
prostitutes.
Police and prostitutes seem to form a very unlikely pairing of
protected classes with which legislators are most concerned. The
Washington law applied only to games in which "the player kills,
injures, or otherwise causes physical harm to a human form in the
game who is depicted, by dress or other recognizable symbols, as a
public law enforcement officer."362 The game Grand Theft Auto: Vice
City, one that Representative Joe Baca so disdains,363 is most often
criticized because "a player gets points for hiring a prostitute, hav-
359. Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 200 F. Supp. 2d
1126, 1129-30 (E.D. Mo. 2002) (describing link between video games and violent
tendencies in youth), rev'd, 329 F.3d 954 (8th Cir. 2003).
360. H.R. 1009, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003) (emphasis added).
361. For a further discussion on "correlation," see supra notes 112-14 and ac-
companying text.
362. H.R. 1009, 58th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2003). A complete legislative
history of this bill can be found on the Washington State Legislature website at
http://www.leg.wa.gov/wsladm/billinfo/dspBillSummary.cfm?billnumber=1009
(last visited June 2, 2004).
363. See Meltz, supra note 110, at HI (writing "Congressman Joe Baca (D-Ca-
lif.) didn't like what he saw when constituents complained about a game called
Grand Theft Auto: Vice City").
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ing sex with her, beating her to death, and taking back his
money."3 64
Ultimately, social science will never provide legally persuasive
answers on video game regulation, nor will it ever resolve debates
about the effects of playing violent video games. As Margaret Tal-
bot,3 65 a fellow at the New America Foundation, wrote in The New
York Times Magazine about what she aptly called "the eternal debate
about whether violent video games cause children who play them to
become more aggressive,":
The truth is that while partisans on both sides are always
declaring the matter resolved by social science, it hasn't
been. There are studies that show short-term increases in
aggressive thoughts and behavior after playing violent
video games -and studies that show decreases. In re-
search that does find an association between aggression
and the consumption of certain kinds of media, it can be
hard or impossible to sort out the effects of television
watching or video-game playing from other factors - liv-
ing in dangerous neighborhoods or with neglectful fami-
lies, for example. And the measures of aggression
sometimes used in lab studies with young children - bop-
ping those inflatable clown dolls that bounce back up
(who are, after all, made to be bopped) or blasting white
noise - are often unhelpful. Playing a lot of violent video
games may contribute to violent behavior - it wouldn't
be all that surprising if it did - and then again, it may
not: rates of adolescent violence have fallen during the
same period that violent video games have become more
widespread and more graphic. 366
In addition to putting forth both anecdotal evidence and social
science studies, the pro-legislation advocates have at least one more
strategy.
364. Id. (describing criticized features of Grand Theft Auto: Vice City).
365. Talbot currently serves as a contributing writer to The New York Times
Magazine, having published several cover stories. She has also has worked as an
editor for both Lingua Franca and The New Republic, and has written for The New
Yorker, Salon, and The Atlantic Monthly. See About Us: Margaret Talbot, Senior Fellow, at
http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=bio&contactlD=21 (last visited June 2,
2004) (providing Talbot's biography).
366. Margaret Talbot, My Son, the Cyborg, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,June 15, 2003, at 11
(describing debate concerning effects of violent video games on adolescent
behavior).
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E. There Are Only Two Interests at Stake -
Parental and Corporate
"This is about parents' rights . . . . The right of parents to
control their children's games outweighs the right of retailers to
make a fast buck by selling adult-rated games to children." 367 That
is how Representative Mary Lou Dickerson of Washington framed
the issue surrounding the alleged need for access-limitation
legislation.3 68
Advocates of anti-access legislation identify only two interests at
stake: those of the corporations that create and produce video
games, and those of the parents whose children play them. The
corporate interest, according to legislative advocates, is pure greed,
not freedom of expression. As Daphne White, executive director of
the Lion & Lamb Project,369 explained to a reporter in June 2003,
shortly after the Eighth Circuit struck down St. Louis County's ordi-
nance, "[t] he industry is clearly marketing to kids and then hiding
behind the First Amendment . . . . They spend hundreds of
thousands of dollars fighting these lawsuits. Why? Because they
want our children to buy these games. '3 70 Not only does White ex-
pose the corporate greed theme, she also raises the parental inter-
est theme by employing the phrase "our children." Greg Quinn, the
head of the St. Louis County Council, which adopted the ordinance
struck down by the Eighth Circuit, framed the appellate court's de-
cision in terms of a blow to the parental interest. He told a newspa-
per reporter, "In our society, parents are the people entrusted with
the upbringing of their children, and we viewed this as assisting
them in doing this with regard to video games."
371
367. Press Release, House Votes to Ban Sales of Cop-Killing Video Games to
Minors, at http://hdc.leg.wa.gov/members/dickerson/gameviolencefp.asp (last
visitedJune 2, 2004) (quoting Representative Dickerson's on passage of anti-access
legislation in Washington).
368. The term "framing" is used in this article to refer to rhetorical strategies,
including choice of words and what facts to include and exclude, which are used in
describing an event and that make salient some issues surrounding the event while
suppressing others, which, in turn, impacts how we think about, understand, and
process the event in question. See generally JOSEPH N. CAPPELLA & KATHLEEN HALL
JAMIESON, SPIRAL OF CyNicisM: THE PRESS AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 38-48, 77-78 (Ox-
ford Univ. Press 1997) (discussing concept of framing within field ofjournalism).
369. See supra note 85 (describing mission of Lion & Lamb Project).
370. Bergman, supra note 334, at B3 (quoting Daphne White) (describing
what some opponents to violent entertainment for children believe to be ineffec-
tive self regulation).
371. Peter Shinkle & Hannah Bergman, Violent Video Games Gain Victory in
Court, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH,June 4, 2003, at A4 (quoting Greg Quinn) (report-
ing reaction to Eighth Circuit's ruling striking down county ordinance).
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Not surprisingly, what is never mentioned by the anti-access ad-
vocates is the third stakeholder involved in the equation - a stake-
holder other than corporations and parents. That stakeholder is
the child and, in particular, the child who desires to play video
games. Children have a First Amendment right to receive
speech.372 This right has been mentioned by both the Circuit
Courts in American Amusement Machine Association373 and Interactive
Digital Software Association.374
In summary, there are multiple rhetorical strategies and meth-
ods employed by the anti-access video game legislative advocates.
This article has identified five techniques that seem to be consist-
ently employed. It is important to both recognize and critique
them, because they provide the spin upon which legislation's cur-
tailing the First Amendment right of free expression is premised.
CONCLUSION
"It's 2003, get over it."3 75
Such was the succinct and astute assessment of seventeen-year-
old Miranda Boncore from Buffalo, New York. She has played
video games for eleven years, calls Grand Theft Auto: Vice City "cool,"
and adds that the sexism and violent sexual behavior in that game
"is a reality of life."'376 But, as this article has shown, legislators in
states across the country just cannot seem to take her advice and get
over it.
This is the state of the controversy, despite the following facts:
" The violent crime rate in the United States is down;37 7
" Courts across the country routinely strike down anti-ac-
cess laws; 378 and
372. See, e.g., Catherine J. Ross, An Emerging Right for Mature Minors to Receive
Information, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 223, 227 (1999) ("The Constitution protects the
right to receive information and ideas. The right to receive information is the
logical corollary of the right to speak.").
373. For a further discussion of the Seventh Circuit's opinion in American
Amusement, see supra notes 3745 and accompanying text.
374. For a further discussion of the Eighth Circuit's opinion in Interactive Digi-
tal, see supra notes 66-78 and accompanying text.
375. Violanti, supra note 336, at El.
376. Id.
377. For a further discussion of the falling crime rate, see supra note 302 and
accompanying text.
378. See, eg., Am. Amusement Mach. Ass'n v. Kendrick, 244 F.3d 572, 580 (7th
Cir. 2001) (finding strong likelihood Indiannapolis ordinance violates free expres-
sion); Interactive Digital Software Ass'n v. St. Louis County, 329 F.3d 954, 960 (8th
Cir. 2003) (holding St. Louis County ordinance cannot survive strict scrutiny);
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* Social science evidence of negative effects is denigrated
by courts. 379
It is time for politicians to stop pandering to the public by sell-
ing them unconstitutional laws and false fears that teens who play
violent video games represent the second coming of Osama Bin
Laden. In fact, at a time when fears of Bin Laden-like terrorism are
quite justified - given the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the
continuing acts of violence in the Middle East - it is a wonder why
politicians are so obsessed with fictitious images of violence on com-
puter games rather than with real life violence.
It is time to put video game violence into perspective. The
threat of real life violence that may result from playing these games
is negligible, and "research about long-term effects of violent gam-
ing, particularly on younger players, is murky and incomplete. '"3 8 0
The anti-access legislation advocates can trot out their now well-
worn anecdotes, like the tragic shootings at Columbine High
School, in which, sure enough, two troubled teens who played a
violent video game called Doom killed people. But, for every Eric
Harris and Dylan Klebold, there are literally hundreds of thousands
of teens that have played Doom and similar fare, such as Grand Theft
Auto: Vice City, and never committed murder, rape, or any other
crime. Must their First Amendment right to receive speech be
sacrificed?
This article has demonstrated that case law precedent is lodged
firmly against anti-access legislation advocates, and that the wave of
currently pending bills is equally likely to be found unconstitutional
and enjoined. This article also has deconstructed and unpacked
the rhetorical strategies of these legislative advocates. Perhaps it is
now time for those individuals to follow Miranda Boncore's advice
to "get over it.''
8 1
Video Software Dealers Ass'n v. Maleng, (W.D. Wash 2003) (No. C03-1245L)
(granting preliminary injunction against Washington law).
379. For a further discussion of the negative reception of social science evi-
dence by courts, see supra notes 97-116 and accompanying text.
380. Chris Seper, Video Games'Allure Sparks Virtual Battle, PLAIN DEALER (Cleve-
land), Mar. 24, 2003, at El (presenting conflicting evidence as to effects of violent
video games).
381. For a further discussion see supra notes 375-76 and accompanying text.
While advising one to "get over it" is not usually thought of as legalese, the authors
note that Alex Kozinski, a maverick conservative judge on the otherwise liberal
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, ended a recent opinion with
the following: "The parties are advised to chill." Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.,
296 F.3d 894, 908 (9th Cir. 2002).
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